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The Cuban Revolution

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THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
AT THIRTY

*Proceedings from a conference sponsored by
the Cuban American National Foundation*

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Washington, D.C.

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THE REVOLUTION AT THIRTY: A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

Jaime Suchlicki

Jaime Suchlicki is Director of the Institute of Inter-American Studies and Professor of History at the University of Miami's Graduate School of International Studies. He is the author or editor of many published articles, monographs, and books on Caribbean and Central American history and foreign relations, including the widely used Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its second edition.

It has been thirty years since Fidel Castro came to power, so I think it is possible now to make an assessment of where the Revolution is, and what are its accomplishments and failures. I would like to divide my talk into four parts: one, the successes and contributions of the Cuban Revolution; two, the failures of the Revolution; three, where Cuba is today; and four, where Cuba is going—and all of that in about twenty minutes.

First of all, the successes and contributions of the Revolution: If we look at the past thirty years the obvious and first thing that comes to mind is the survival of the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro has been able to survive six U.S. administrations, the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis, as well as other crises. So survivability has been one of the characteristics of Fidel Castro and an important element in the Cuban Revolution.

The second contribution or success is the militarization of Cuba. Cuba is today, aside from the United States, probably the most important military power in the Western Hemisphere, with armed forces in excess of 300,000 men, a territorial militia of 500,000 men—armed, well-equipped, and well-trained—and with some 300,000 men that have seen military service in Angola. It is the only army in Latin America—maybe aside from the Salvadoran army—that has had to fight consistently and has seen this kind of military service.

The projection of military power has also been one of the significant characteristics of the Cuban Revolution. Fidel has projected power in Africa, and is projecting power in Central America. Cuba is a regional power, although we could call it a world power, probably out of proportion to its size,

its population and its resources. Cuba flexes its muscles not only in Latin America, but also in Africa and the Middle East, and sits down at conferences with South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. So Cuba and Fidel have achieved world stature.

Finally, perhaps the most significant contribution of Fidel Castro is his commitment to violence; in other words, his contribution to revolutionary theory is the way to power in Latin America and elsewhere is not through the ballot box but through bullets.

So having looked at the contributions of the Cuban Revolution, let's look at the failures of thirty years of Fidel Castro. First of all, he has destroyed Western values, culture, and ideas in Cuba. The things that are dear to the Western world—democracy, human rights, the family, religious freedom, individualism, free enterprise—are non-existent in Cuba. Fidel Castro has eradicated these values and for thirty years has remained a bastion against Western culture and values in Cuba.

"Perhaps the most important failure of the Revolution is in the area of the youth. The Cuban Revolution has not captured the imagination of the Cuban youth..."

A second failure is Cuba today is probably more dependant on the Soviet Union than it was on the United States prior to 1958. Not only is it dependent economically, politically, and militarily on the Soviet Union, but it is more dependant today on the sugar economy than it was prior to 1958. In other words, Cuba has not diversified; it has not moved from monoculture. In fact, it has re-emphasized it.

Third, Fidel has created a society of scarcity and repression. Of all the societies in Latin America, Cuba is probably the most totalitarian and the most repressive. The Cuban people are suffering from scarcity, as most products are rationed today in Cuba. So, economically, the Revolution has not fulfilled its promises of 1959.

Perhaps the most important failure of the Revolution is in the area of the youth. The Cuban Revolution has not captured the imagination of the Cuban youth, and if it did in the beginning, has lost it now. Cuba is characterized now by disillusionment and cynicism. The youth in Cuba are not interested in the slogans of the Revolution. The new generation, the "New Man" Fidel Castro promised in 1959, has not been created.

This is a brief summary of where I see the Revolution after thirty years. Where is Cuba today?

First of all, Fidel Castro is the last Stalinist leader in the communist world. He has returned recently to the failed policies of the past. He is emphasizing again moral incentives. He toyed, for example, in 1979-80, with material incentives. He allowed the opening of the *mercados populares*, or popular markets. He allowed a budding capitalism and free enterprise in Cuba, but then in 1983-84, began to close it down in part because he saw *perestroika* as a threat to his position. Cuba has gone through a period of *perestroika*. But Castro has seen what it can do and doesn't like it. He sees it as a threat to his power, to his control in Cuba, and is not willing to provide that transformation. He has gone back to the ideas of creating a "New Man," that Cubans work best when they are motivated by ideas, ideology, and moral incentives rather than material incentives. So there is this policy of the "rectification of errors" of the past that in a sense maybe is reminiscent of the cultural revolution in China, maybe not as bloody as China, but there is a re-emphasis on the old values, the old ideas he tried to impose in Cuba in the 1960s that did not work.

In Cuba's foreign affairs, there are several elements that have remained consistent over the past thirty years. One is internationalism, Castro's commitment to violent revolution, to supporting revolutionary and terrorist groups in various parts of the world. Internationalism also takes the form of state-to-state relations. We see Fidel Castro as the statesman going to Ecuador for the inauguration of President Borja and meeting with Latin American leaders. On this level, internationalism is seeking acceptability and respectability as a statesman in Latin America. A third level of internationalism is his connections with groups throughout Latin America and other parts of the world—labor groups, student groups, political parties and political organizations.

"Cuba has gone through a period of perestroika. But Castro has seen what it can do and doesn't like it."

The next important element in Castro's foreign policy is anti-Americanism. Castro's contribution to history, as he sees it, is his position against the United States, whether it is by supporting revolutionary groups, uniting Latin America on the question of the debt crisis, or creating mischief for the United States in Latin America. What makes Castro tick is his anti-Americanism.

The final element of his foreign policy is his solidarity with the Soviet Union. We have heard significant statements recently about the divisions and the problems between Cuba and the Soviet Union. And there are problems. There have been problems between Cuba and the Soviet Union going back to Khrushchev. These differences included Fidel's apprehension about the limit to Soviet support of Cuba, especially in case of crisis; the limits of Soviet support toward revolutionary regimes like Grenada and Nicaragua; and the insistence of the Soviet Union on economic changes. Yet these differences have to be balanced against the intertwined relationship—at the military, party, and state level—that exists between Cuba and the Soviet Union and has developed over the past thirty years.

"Castro's contribution to history, as he sees it, is his position against the United States..."

Cuba provides the Soviet Union with a military base and a base for espionage at Lourdes. The DGI works very closely with the KGB throughout the world. Cuba votes with the Soviet Union at the United Nations and it receives military and economic aid to the tune of four-and-a-half to five billion dollars a year. This relationship has been cemented over the past thirty years and is not likely to break up or fall apart because of Gorbachev's *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. I see Cuba continuing to be tied to the Soviet Union and as a continuing element in Soviet worldwide interests.

There is also a convergence of Soviet and Cuban views in Central America. It is in Gorbachev's interest to have a relaxation of tensions between Cuba and the United States and between the United States and Nicaragua. The Soviet and Cuban objectives coincide in the consolidation of the Nicaraguan Revolution at a low cost to the Soviet Union.

If Gorbachev is able to prevail on the new U.S. administration to normalize relations with Nicaragua and to normalize relations with Cuba, he would achieve this significant goal. So in this sense we have seen the overtures, mild overtures, of Fidel Castro toward the United States: normalization of immigration agreements, allowing certain religious leaders to visit Cuba. There is an element of tokenism on the part of Cuba toward the United States in the hope of achieving this immediate objective of reducing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting both Cuba and Nicaragua.

I am doubtful Fidel Castro is willing to provide the meaningful conces-

sions necessary for normalization with the United States. It always puzzles me how we think we can buy Third World leaders like Fidel Castro or Qaddafi. It is misreading the intentions, objectives, and the things that make Fidel Castro tick when we think we can sell him computers and Fruit of the Loom underwear, buy Cuban sugar, and somehow he will become the Tito of the Western Hemisphere, abandoning world revolution and his commitment to the Soviet Union and allies throughout the world. If Fidel Castro had a real commitment to economic development in Cuba and to the Cuban people, he wouldn't have carried out many of the policies and actions he has carried out in the world. Fidel Castro is less concerned about whether the Cubans eat better and more concerned about his position in history and his position in the world.

Fidel Castro hasn't mellowed in thirty years. I don't think there is any indication he was mellowed—read his last speech or his speech commemorating the anniversary of the Revolution. He is as combative and as anti-American as he's always been. To think we can weaken his relationship with the Soviet Union and normalize relations, and Cuba will abandon world revolution and its commitment abroad is an illusion. Every four years I see this illusion emerging in Washington and every four years I see it go down the drain.

"Fidel Castro is less concerned about whether the Cubans eat better and more concerned about his position in history and his position in the world."

The only rabbit that Fidel Castro has in his hat now is relations with the United States. Yet he is not willing to provide meaningful concessions—concessions regarding the Soviet military presence in Cuba, his commitment to revolutionary violence, and internal democratization. Relations with the United States at this point will provide a longer lease on life to his economically disastrous regime. It would give hope to the Cuban people that things are going to get better. It is ironic that when the Cuban economy is at a low point, when our policy of thirty years has been somewhat successful, we are now again talking about normalizing relations with Cuba.

Thank you.

THE REVOLUTION AT THIRTY: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

Ernesto Betancourt

Ernesto Betancourt is Director of the USIA's Radio Martí Program, which transmits news and entertainment to Cuba. Born in Cuba, he was the representative in Washington of Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement during the insurrection against Batista. He was a participant in the revolutionary government during the first year of the Revolution before breaking with the regime in 1960. Mr. Betancourt has worked as an economic consultant throughout Latin America for the OAS, World Bank, AID, and Inter-American Development Bank.

If we are going to look at the economic record of the Revolution, we should start by examining the goals the Revolution set for itself. In the economic sphere, they were fairly simple: to reduce Cuba's dependency on sugar, to reduce its dependency on a single market, and to attain economic growth.

In 1961, when Ché Guevara was at Punta del Este, Uruguay, where the Alliance for Progress was launched, he made a speech he later regretted. He said, and I quote, "The rate of growth that is given by the Alliance for Progress as a beautiful thing for all the Americas is 2.5 percent of net growth. Bolivia announced five percent for ten years. We congratulated the Bolivian representative while telling him that with a little effort and the mobilization of popular forces he could say ten percent. We speak of ten percent of development without any figure, ten percent of development is the rate that Cuba foresees for the coming years. What does Cuba expect to have by 1980? A net per capita income of \$3,000, more than the United States currently has."

Before I came to work for the U.S. government, I prepared a comparative analysis of development between Cuba and other countries in Latin America, using the World Bank *World Development Report* data. It showed that Cuba by 1981 had a growth rate that ranged from minus six percent to a little over one-half percent. According to the 1981 *World Development Report*, Cuba had only attained a range of income of between \$880 to \$1100 in absolute terms—one-

third of what Ché Guevara said was going to be the net per capita income in 1980.

What does that mean in relative terms? This is important because there are many current statistics quoted about Cuba that ignore the base from which Cuba started. In 1952, in a study prepared by the OAS on relative development by the different countries in the region, Cuba was ranked third in gross national product per capita, just below Venezuela and Argentina. By 1981, on the basis of these figures from the World Bank, Cuba fell to 15th in GNP per capita. This is a very significant figure and a very significant indicator of the comparative development attained by Cuba as a result of the Revolution. The goal Guevara gave was not attained. Obviously, if you don't have growth in the pie there is less pie distributed. This is a basic difficulty that Cuba is facing.

The neglect of investment in productive activities and the diversion of manpower and other resources to building up an incredible military machine is one of the causes of Cuba's lack of growth. Recent defectors from the Cuban government in the economic area have commented on their disappointment when they saw it was almost impossible for the country to grow economically because of the diversion of resources to military activities. This is one point that should be kept in mind when we consider the accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution.

"The neglect of investment in productive activities and the diversion of manpower and other resources to building up an incredible military machine is one of the causes of Cuba's lack of growth."

Another goal that was given, as I mentioned earlier, was to reduce sugar dependency. Latin America as a whole tried during these years to reduce its dependency on basic products. In this category, Cuba has again fallen substantially behind the other countries in Latin America. In terms of the actual proportion of manufactured products out of the total amount of exports of the country, as of 1981, Cuba ranked only above Haiti and Panama in the proportion of manufactured goods in its exports. That means Cuba continues to be a basic producer of sugar while the rest of the region has diversified its export composition. Cuba has not diversified at all. The main reason is it has been assigned the role of the sugar plantation for the Soviet bloc.

This failure is significant for Cuban development. To develop enterprises

capable of competing in manufactured goods in world markets takes easily five to ten years. Cuba has wasted three decades in learning experience by not joining the Latin American common market, or the Central American and Caricom integration efforts. By its own decision, Cuba isolated itself from the markets in the Americas while turning toward the Soviet bloc markets, where Cuba was assigned a raw material producer role.

"Cuba has not diversified at all. The main reason is it has been assigned the role of the sugar plantation for the Soviet bloc."

The third goal, that of reducing reliance on a single market, is another goal that was not attained. Cuba used to sell between 70 and 80 percent of its exports to the United States. It was a trade relationship that was considered negatively by the leadership of the Cuban Revolution. In the initial period of the Revolution there was a consensus something had to be done to open up new markets; that is, to diversify the markets. At that time, I was Director of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade with the revolutionary government and one of the purposes of this bank was precisely to try to find other markets for Cuban products.

The situation is very disappointing in that respect. From 1981 to the present, trade concentration has worsened. By 1980, 75 percent of Cuba's trade was with the Socialist bloc and 25 percent with the market economies. However, by 1987 the situation had worsened to the point that Cuba had 88 percent of its trade with the Soviet Bloc and only 12 percent with the market economies. At the same time, Cuba has built a substantial foreign debt with the West that is now affecting Cuba's ability to continue trading with the West. So these are some of the key indicators that can be used to measure what has been accomplished by the Cuban Revolution in the economic area in the last thirty years.

What is the situation today?

During the last three years, the Cuban economy has deteriorated substantially. A critical factor has been Cuba's inability to continue servicing its foreign debt to Western banks. In July 1986, Cuba stopped payments on its foreign debt. U.S. banks are not involved in the Paris Club because of the embargo. As a consequence of having defaulted on its debt, Cuba had to rely on short-term credits or supplier credits. This type of financing is less reliable and more expensive than long-term credits. The result has been a dramatic

increase in the proportion of short-term debt in the Cuban foreign debt structure. In addition, as even the short-term credits dry up, Cuba has been unable to continue acquiring some very basic items for the Cuban economy. Some specialists familiar with the workings of the present Cuban economy consider that a level of at least 20 percent of trade with the West is necessary to acquire the raw materials and spare parts that the Soviet bloc cannot provide and are needed because of the structure of the Cuban economy.

Cuba has not been able to attain the level of exports to the West required to pay for its imports in convertible currencies. Therefore, unless Cuba can obtain financing, the country has no means with which to pay for imports from the West. But this financing is now not feasible because Cuba has defaulted in paying its foreign debt. Therefore, last year Cuba was forced to cut its imports from Western countries by \$800 million. This in turn has created severe scarcities and shortages in the manufacturing sector for domestic consumption and transportation, as well as in the ability to produce for export.

This is a very damaging development for Cuba's ability to continue growing at the very slow pace it has attained up to now. If the trend continues, we will find the situation even more damaging for the well-being of the Cuban people. Last year, the Cuban government announced in its report to the Paris Club that Cuba intended to have one percent growth in its gross social product for 1987. When the report was presented at the end of the year, the government had to acknowledge instead that there has been a decline of 3.5 percent in the gross social product. If you take into account the growth of population during the year, the per capita GSP decreased even further.

"Last year, the Cuban government announced in its report to the Paris Club that Cuba intended to have one percent growth in its gross social product for 1987. When the report was presented at the end of the year, the government had to acknowledge instead that there has been a decline of 3.5 percent in the gross social product."

The figures for 1988 are not out, so we don't know yet what has happened. However, there was no change in Cuba's access to Western capital since the negotiations with the Paris Club have been paralyzed due to Cuba's inability to pay. The output for 1988 is likely to reflect an additional decline in the gross social product. Whether it will be 3.5 percent as it was in 1987 is hard to say.

We have had some interim reports that are contradictory because in general terms the government has a figure claiming Cuba has attained some growth in the first half of the year. On the other hand, Cuba was unable to meet its sugar production goals for 1988. Sugar production carries such weight in the total output of the Cuban economy that it is very hard for the gross social product to grow when sugar output is declining.

Due to the constraint in imported factors of production there are no other industries that can offset a decline in sugar output. Therefore, Cuban claims of growth in 1988 have to be viewed with great skepticism. The foreign exchange deficit that Cuba projected for 1989 was \$3.7 billion. In 1982, the ceiling that had been established by the banks was \$3.5 billion for debt to the West. Therefore, the amount due now for one year alone is more than the total amount of debt that Cuba had in 1982.

The fact is Cuba has not been getting any new credit, but the debt keeps growing. The Cubans give several reasons as to why this is happening. One of the main reasons they give is the devaluation of the dollar. Cuba sells in dollars but buys in other hard currencies from Germany, England, France, Italy, Spain, and Japan, and currencies of these countries have appreciated vis-a-vis the dollar. The result is Cuba's debt, without any additional lending, continues to increase. Another factor causing this increase without new loans is the inability to pay and service the existing debt. The interest due each year keeps accumulating and is converted to principal.

In addition to external factors in trade and debt, the present Cuban economic predicament is due to Castro's domestic economic policies. In 1986, Castro abandoned the system of economic management that had been established in 1975 by Humberto Pérez, with Castro's approval and Soviet prodding. Castro realized he was losing control over individual citizens' economic well-being. Therefore, he decided to dismantle the system completely and revert to centralized management of the economy, eliminating the peasant markets and private markets for services, housing, et cetera.

Three years ago, the regime told Cubans they could sell their houses to their fellow citizens in a bilateral exchange. They didn't have to go through the government. At the beginning of this year, a law was passed returning all real estate transactions to the state. You have to sell your house to the government and then they will decide the price and to whom the house is going to be sold. They eliminated this free market because it was considered to have led to speculation and unjustified profits for people.

As was mentioned before by Jaime, instead of *perestroika*, what Castro

has established in Cuba is what he calls "rectification of errors." As a result of this change in domestic policies, the incentive that had led people to acquire wealth and make money was dismantled. Cubans are no longer able to get something for themselves while at the same time expanding the supply of services and goods for the population outside official channels. Now, the economy is not to be ruled by the acquisitions motive and material incentives but by what is called "moral incentives," glorifying Ché Guevara's ideas again. Therefore, the economic system in Cuba is going in a completely opposite direction from what is happening in the Soviet bloc under the *perestroika* reforms.

An endemic problem of Cuba's economic system has also been investment decisions. Cuba has a personalistic decision-making system for investments. If Fidel Castro catches an interest in an industry, money and other material resources are made available for investment in that industry on a priority basis. Any question on the economic feasibility of the investment is overruled by Castro's judgments. However, the minute the project gets into trouble, Castro makes the problem the responsibility of somebody else. Whoever was in charge of that industry is then demoted and discredited and has no chance of responding to Castro's accusations.

"Cubans are no longer able to get something for themselves while at the same time expanding the supply of services and goods for the population outside official channels."

One typical example of Castro's investment mistakes is cattle. Fidel got interested in cattle-raising and genetic experimentation. He wanted to invent a new variety of cow, a mix of Cebu and Holstein cattle that was expected to produce both meat and milk. After years of experiments, the cows did not produce more milk or more meat. Tens of millions of dollars were wasted. Air-conditioned facilities were built for prize cattle. One prize bull, *Rosafé*, became a hero in the official press. *Ulbre Blanca*, a cow that produced a high milk output under chemical stimulants, became a heroine of the Revolution. Castro was given the title of Father of Genetics.

However, at the beginning of last year, a census was taken. To the surprise of the government, it was found that the number of heads of cattle in Cuba was smaller than before the Revolution. Therefore, the government declared this census secret and it was not published. Castro has abandoned the

cattle business as an area of priority and is now investing in Interferon and biotechnology. Afterwards, he will invest in whatever other things catch his fancy.

"Therefore, the economic system in Cuba is going in a completely opposite direction from what is happening in the Soviet bloc under the perestroika reforms."

The head of the F.A.O. team who questioned Castro's ideas on genetic experiments was removed. Those in charge of the activity have been blamed for the failure and are now in disgrace. *Ulbre Blanca*, the glorious cow which was a heroine of the Revolution, died and has been desiccated. She is exhibited at the Museum of the Revolution so "future generations can admire her magnificent udders." Last year, *Grimma* reported a marble statue of *Ulbre Blanca* had been completed. The article in the newspaper was very amusing because somebody managed to catch a smile on the face of *Ulbre Blanca*. I have tried very hard to find out how a cow smiles. However, since I have not attained the required level of Marxist-Leninist sophistication, I have been unable to do that.

What is happening now and what may happen in the future? We have an agreement to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola. This may have some significance in relation to Cuba's economy. One of the most thorough analysts of the Cuban economy, Jorge Pérez López—unfortunately he couldn't be here today—has provided some revealing data on the Soviet subsidy for Cuban sugar. This data is relevant to what is perhaps going to happen with the Soviet subsidy to Cuba. From 1975 to 1976, according to this table, the estimated subsidy—and he has two ways of computing it—jumped from about \$500 million to \$1 billion and from there on it continued increasing. This seems to establish a correlation with the increase of Cuban troops at the service or as surrogate of the Soviet Union imperial interests in Africa. It was in 1975 that Cuban troops were sent to Angola. The correlation continues in 1976 when Cuba sent troops to Ethiopia. There seems to be a pay-off there. The subsidy-troop link is very clearly established. In fact, I told Jorge that perhaps he should have an additional column in the tables showing Cuban troops at the service of the Soviet Union so we can establish a better correlation between the two series. In order to establish the real level of Soviet subsidy, we will have to establish a price for mercenary soldiers. Perhaps *Soldier*

of Fortune want ads would provide the market price.

What is going to happen now that the Soviets don't seem to have use for more mercenary troops from Cuba for their imperial adventures? The economic situation in the Soviet Union indicates that the Soviets may begin to consider lowering these subsidies.

There are two additional pieces of information relating to the future that are worth mentioning. The Cubans were forced to borrow one million tons of sugar in March of last year from sugar brokers in France and England in order to meet their sugar commitments to the Soviet Union. The deal was worth about \$220 or \$250 million. It involved a swap of existing sugar for future sugar from the 1989 crop with the Soviets guaranteeing payment. We don't know yet what that crop is going to be but the important point is that Cuba has already used one million tons of the 1989 crop to fulfill its 1988 commitments of sugar exports to the Soviet Union. There is little likelihood that Cuba could increase sugar production that much in 1989. It would require doubling that amount: one million tons to meet the advance and one million to reach the level of commitment to the Soviets. If that is the case, the deficit will force the Soviets to honor their guarantee of the \$200 million in advance. Once again, Cuba would have been unable to fulfill its sugar commitments to the Soviets. The difference now is this happens at a time when there is a basic disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba as to what course to follow in foreign policy, and *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

"...Cuba has already used one million tons of the 1989 crop to fulfill its 1988 commitments of sugar exports to the Soviet Union."

I find it hard to believe Mr. Gorbachev is going to continue subsidizing the Cuban economy indefinitely while Castro ignores and even ridicules the reforms he has concluded are necessary to make the Soviet Union more efficient. There is a significant signal of some pressure behind closed doors. I just checked with our correspondent in Europe in anticipation of this meeting because we had not received any news about the economic assistance agreement for 1989 between Cuba and the Soviet Union. There is no report the agreement has been signed as of this date. This is a very important fact, because Cuba depends so much on the Soviet subsidy in order to finance the national budget and other activities.

The second piece of information that has a bearing on future economic

trends has to do with the budget. The budget figures for 1989 were just published and one interesting element that came up in those figures is that the deficit in Cuba's budget for 1989 is going to be in the neighborhood of \$16 hundred million. This is a substantial increase in the yearly budget deficit. This means Cuba will probably face a situation of rapid acceleration in inflation.

"I find it hard to believe Mr. Gorbachev is going to continue subsidizing the Cuban economy indefinitely while Castro ignores and even ridicules the reforms he has concluded are necessary to make the Soviet Union more efficient."

There is going to be an increasing amount of Cuban pesos following a limited amount of goods. When that happens you have inflation, because the additional liquidity resulting from the government printing money cannot be matched by additional products due to the previously mentioned constraints in capacity to finance imports or to expand domestic production.

This is in a nutshell what has happened to the Cuban economy in the years since Castro came to power.

A RESPONSE

Irving Louis Horowitz

Irving Louis Horowitz is Hannah Arendt Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Rutgers University, where he is also director of Transaction, the publisher of record in the social sciences and public policy. Professor Horowitz is a long-standing analyst of Cuban affairs, and his edited work on Cuban Communism is now going into its seventh edition. It is scheduled for release in June 1989.

As I have not been privy to this material nor to the presentations until the present moment, my remarks are based only on what I have heard this

morning. I am going to confine myself to my role as respondent rather than provide yet a third analysis of the current situation of the Cuban Revolution of 1959. But such reflections will obviously reflect my own professional emphasis and spill over the borders of my assignment.

The presentations of my friends and colleagues, Jaime Suchlicki and Ernesto Betancourt, were interesting, incisive, and informative. I would expect no less given their acute sense of the current Cuban scene. Nonetheless, I am not entirely sure what direction they point to in terms of the immediate future for the Cuban Revolution. I have the feeling, at least for myself, there is a concern about where we, as independent but concerned observers, go from here in terms of thirty years of the Cuban Revolution. Professor Suchlicki and Dr. Betancourt provide a cautious sense of the future; quite proper given the instincts for survival of Cuba's "Maximum Leader" in the face of adversity.

I want to take up sequentially first what Jaime presented and then what Ernesto spoke about. We have had these sorts of discussion many times in the past. Indeed, many of my own persuasions and positions emerged from those discourses. But my view proceeds from a sociological rather than purely political-economic orientation.

Let me begin with a seeming digression: the twenty-minute segment that CBS produced a few weeks ago on its *60 Minutes* program. The Cuban press representative who was interviewed—perhaps orchestrated would be a better word—was a senior, suave figure from Radio or Television Havana. He asked the rhetorical question: "What would Cuba have looked like without the Revolution?" It is a reasonable question, but he gave an unreasonable answer.

"It is interesting that the Revolution now defends itself in social rather than political terms..."

He said Cuba would have had more prostitution, gambling, and drugs than even existed in 1959. Those of you who have seen that segment will recollect that it was a compelling argument. It is interesting that the Revolution now defends itself in social rather than political terms, that the main advances Cuban officials saw in their Revolution had to do with the elimination of what they feel are the social diseases of advanced societies: curbing prostitution, eliminating gambling, and minimizing drug use. We are told

one can walk safely in the streets of Havana; but one cannot walk as safely presumably or presumptively in the streets of Miami. While it was admitted one million plus people left Cuba for bourgeois lands, it was pointed out nine million remained in this "socialist paradise." That is really the essence of the self-image of the Revolution after thirty years, and no less the image which the regime now seeks to export to America. It is intriguing that the emphasis is now so exclusively sociological; yet it manages to leave out of the reckoning Cuba in 1959 already had the finest health care system in Latin America and also the lowest illiteracy rate.

One of the ironies and also anomalies of development, almost a law or at least a constant in social science, is a certain amount of deviance is consonant with a certain amount of economic development. Such a lock-step of collective goods and evils may not make for the most pleasant formula, but it is historically accurate. We know all rapidly developing societies in the modern world—England in the 17th century, France in the 18th century, Germany in the 19th century, and the United States in the 20th century—have had a corollary between deviant types of behavior and innovative forms of change. This may not be the most attractive correlation to contemplate. It may not be the most uplifting formula for explaining human growth, but if a purely puritanical society or purely revolutionary society succeeds in eliminating all forms of deviance, that society is also usually marked by a high level of authoritarianism. Rapid development is expensive in human terms. Ricardo, Marx, Schumpeter, Weber, Keynes, all understood as much. In contemporary terms, those reformers who want development without deviance from below, usually have to substitute militarism from above to gain their ends.

"In contemporary terms, those reformers who want development without deviance from below, usually have to substitute militarism from above to gain their ends."

Probably the safest place to walk in pre-war Europe was Berlin between 1933 and 1945. If it's safety on the streets one wants, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia probably were the best. They coped with, if not eliminated, all forms of deviance; at least those not explicitly sanctioned by bizarre character types like Joseph Goebbels in Berlin or Lavrenti Beria within Kremlin walls. In fact, the film *Cabaret* deals exactly with this theme; that is, what

happens in Weimar Germany when storm troopers eliminate the night clubs in the name of higher morality. The answer is painfully apparent: they end with the elimination of democracy itself.

This return to the morally-centered, top-down approach to the personal realm is a very important characteristic of present-day Cuba. It has to be emphasized, not avoided. What has been lost in this thirty years is a sense of vivacity of the private life, a life that is not subject to block-by-block, house-by-house, inspection by keepers of the ethical flame. In short, a sense of deviance goes along with a sense of development in an open society—yes, like Miami! And just as assuredly and as often, the demand for a monistic ethic corresponds with economic stagnation.

"What has been lost in this thirty years is a sense of vivacity of the private life, a life that is not subject to block-by-block, house-by-house, inspection by keepers of the ethical flame."

The social issues now raised in Havana are not something that represent a regime afterthought. We who support a free Cuba must confront not just questions of the political or the economic successes and failures of the Revolution. We must all confront the everyday life of a Revolution gone awry, and the subjective life of a society. What kind of society does one want to live in as a human being, as a practicing person, as a practicing private individual? I suspect most people living in a free society are concerned exactly with those aspects of the Cuban society. Here the successes of the Cuban regime are indeed very modest. Even though it may be the case as the Cuban representative said on that particular segment of television, that drugs are not a Havana problem—a debatable proposition from all reports—or not a problem for the Cubans as a whole, the social problems are made real for the rest of us by the drug trafficking of the Cuban regime itself.

The social character of a revolution is important, especially for a Cuban people deeply committed to traditional values. But it is precisely these values the Castro regime defines as most repugnant. The entire notion of creating a "New Man" top down, long since given up as a goal throughout the rest of the socialist world, remains very much at the core of Castro's declared goals. It is for this reason he is willing to brave economic failure, lest he be compelled to come to terms with the moral bankruptcy of the regime as such. So the question of successes and failures of the Cuban Revolution is a tricky one, very

complicated, that has to be dealt with candidly and at the same time with greater sensitivity. Thirty years after a revolution we are dealing with a society not less than a polity and an economy.

Jaime identified four areas of success of the Cuban Revolution. But I thought they were kind of back-handed successes at best—survivability, militarization, becoming a world power, and commitment to violence. These may indeed be primary characteristics of the Castro regime, but can they be termed successes, and, if so, in what sense of that ubiquitous word?

To start with, survivability is not success. It may be one measure of success, but not necessarily so, if Fidel cannot convert the original charismatic leadership into some kind of rational form of state authority. The dilemma in Cuba, increasingly a growing dilemma, is that the administrative base of the Revolution, instead of becoming broader or deeper, has become so narrow that it has now been reduced to an intimate family system. Cuba is one of the Communist states, with Romania and North Korea, that can now be identified in terms of dynastic properties, as one of a category of dynastic communism itself. This may be a mark of survivability for the Cuban Revolution, but it is not a mark of success in long-term political or developmental terms.

"The dilemma in Cuba...is that the administrative base of the Revolution, instead of becoming broader or deeper, has become so narrow that it has now been reduced to an intimate family system."

As for militarization, again Cuba shows a mixed pattern of success. It has reached a degree of high mobilization of a portion of the population that has resulted in stratification of the society. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has called this the Prussianization of Cuban society; in which a segment of the population becomes a Praetorian Guard. As a result of this militarization of Cuba, the youth are not captured by the Revolution, are not engaged in the imagination of the Revolution. Thus the use of the armed forces as illustrative of what constitutes Cuban communism's success can just as readily be turned about. Those who are highly militarized can point to the youth of the nation lost on foreign soil as exemplars of their own failure, of the failure of the Castro Revolution itself. In short, militarization at one level may be successful, but at another, it is a failure in social terms. Militarization does not involve integration of the youth of the island, but its dissolution.

The question of Cuba as a world power is really much more a question of

Cuba as a world pretender. It is true the pretentious aspects of Fidel have been in terms of Cuba being a world power. The fact is there has been an enormous scale-back even in Cuban pretenses about being a global power. It is much more likely to be defined now as a regional power, and not even a Latin American power. One might argue, as indeed I did argue some years ago, the very pretense to be a world power, in the globalization of the Cuban Revolution, led to a much more palpable and more militant response to the Revolution elsewhere in the Caribbean region and in Central America, and that it perhaps slowed down rather than accelerated the kind of revolutionary fervor exhibited elsewhere in the hemisphere. It is fair to say over thirty years there has been a much slower rather than rapid evolution of the kinds of revolutionary fervor that Fidel predicted when he assumed power. Like Lenin before him vis-a-vis Europe, Fidel predicted that communism would spread in Latin America like wildfire. This has not been the case.

As for the issue of commitment to violence, again as Jaime is well aware, we are talking about a mixed blessing. The support of terror is a double-edged sword, one that can serve as a mobilizing element against his own regime. In short, I am not entirely sure the Castro regime would itself consider all these elements successes of the regime; at least not without a good deal of embarrassment.

"Like Lenin before him vis-a-vis Europe, Fidel predicted that communism would spread in Latin America like wildfire. This has not been the case."

The regime failures were properly and succinctly identified by Jaime. But again one has the feeling that in terms of self-images, the Cuban Revolution may be turned on its head. The destruction of Western values or the Western moral order, anti-Americanism, the substitution of a moral economy for an economic morality, the return to scarcity, et cetera, might more readily be viewed as the crowning achievements of this bizarre regime. These elements of Cuban communism are not necessarily viewed by the regime itself as failures, so much as they are mobilizing devices in the absence of material satisfactions.

Turning now to Ernesto's concerns, one of the problems analysts always have to bear in mind, whether we are dealing with political or economic data, is that the quality of the data, even though they may be negative, is not

necessarily indicative of the power of the regime to carry on. The survivability or the potential of the regime is often against the economic grain. Quite the contrary, yet another kind of sociological axiom must be called into play: when there is a high level of mobilization, the conditions of repression increase, while the conditions of mass expectation (much less satisfaction) may decrease. This is doubly true in island economies, where the question of currency values take on special local dimensions. The value of the Cuban peso may be zilch in terms of the regional economy or negative in terms of the world economy. Still, you may have virtually a bankrupt economy operating even at marginal levels and in successful ways.

The description of Castro by Jaime and Ernesto as the last Stalinist on the international stage is quite correct. But the consequences of this anomaly has greater ramifications for the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, than for the United States under Bush. The United States has already factored Castro's political intransigence into its policy response. It now remains a problem for the Soviets to do likewise.

One wonders what the explanation is for the regime's eccentric behavior. Is there a political explanation, a psychological explanation, or some combination of the two? I would certainly like to know more from Jaime along these lines.

"The United States has already factored Castro's political intransigence into its policy response. It now remains a problem for the Soviets to do likewise."

One outcome of the Cuban Revolution, something that seems to take place in every Communist revolution at one stage or another, is an anomaly, a paradox: a highly politicized regime, with a high level of mobilization presumably on formal occasions, becomes an empty depoliticized society, where politics is the last reality, as it were; where real political debate and real political analysis do not take place. That is to say precisely because of the high ranks and high penalties involved in the political processes of a totalitarian regime, and the numbers of victims of that society, real and symbolic, politics is emptied of all content and meaning. Slogans replace politics in all essential terms.

The outcome of thirty years of the Revolution is not a high level of political consciousness, or a "New Man," or all the slogans that were initially put forth

by the founders, but an emptying out of the political process giving way to bureaucratic inertia. In order to restore that political process, of course, you have to open up the society, and that is exactly what Fidel does not want to do. He is not going to have what might be termed a "Hungarian Solution"; he is not going to have the restoration of politics, because that would mean a limit, a finite limit, on his ability to survive or to rule.

"...a highly politicized regime, with a high level of mobilization presumably on formal occasions, becomes an empty depoliticized society, where politics is the last reality, as it were; where real political debate and real political analysis do not take place."

What Jaime was talking about in his political assessment is curiously about an anti-political or at the least a non-political society; a society without politics in any overt, manifest sense. We endow Cuba with a political life here in the United States. It is not a society in which political discourse and political debate occur, and it is almost a remarkable, miraculous thing to say, for those who know Cubans, or who know Cuba in an earlier age, to say the end of politics is a consequence of the integration of communism. The Cuban people, almost by second nature given to political discourse, have been reduced to silence or mock celebration.

Ernesto is such a profound economic historian with such an extraordinary command of the data that it is always important to listen to him with great care. With respect to his major points: first, he calls to mind what was in fact the case twenty or thirty years ago vis-a-vis what it is now. That Cuba was a well-developed nation within an underdeveloped hemispheric context. And he calls to mind the desultory consequences, the desultory outcome of the Revolution in economic terms, the failure of the Revolution to achieve diversification, the failure of the Revolution to achieve a breakthrough in terms of the sugar economy; all of the many, many promissory notes that have simply not been delivered upon. The decline in the Cuban economy is not just a matter of dull data; it is a matter of overwhelming importance. Cuba was not a badly underdeveloped country at the time of the Revolution. It was the third ranking developed country in Latin America. It has moved from 1959 to 1989 to something like the 16th or 18th ranking country in Latin America. And that is no small measure of devolution, not revolution. A regime has to work very hard to have such a backward spin in its economy over three decades.

Having said that, we also come to another anomaly in the study of revolutionary behavior. Negative data rarely overturn regimes. Economic news of poor performances, however tragic, does not necessarily result in a burst of economic or political activity, or a new age dawning upon us. Fidel's colossal blunders in the economic catastrophe sometimes creates forms of mobilization. As one has a backward march of the economy, we have at the same time, an increasing mobilization of the Cuban population. How long such a supreme paradox can be maintained is a question. While it cannot go on forever, such a regime can apparently sustain itself precisely by casting itself as a victim of its own policy mistakes.

"The Cuban people, almost by second nature given to political discourse, have been reduced to silence or mock celebration."

The Soviet Union, specifically the Gorbachev "revolution within a revolution," is a statement of the triumph of the practical over the ideological—an indication that a society cannot forever mobilize a population politically while moving back economically. And, in fact, the message of the Soviet government to the Cuban government, as issued early on in the year 1989 as a sort of indirect birthday message, reads like something that could have come out of the Reagan White House in 1981. Ernesto and I both picked this up from the sub-secretariat report of the Soviet equivalent to the State Department, someone who reports directly to Shevardnadze. The Soviet government now appears to say ultra-leftist regimes promise much but deliver nothing, promise socialism but do not deliver socialism, promise democracy but do not deliver on democracy, can no longer be tolerated, or if tolerated, can no longer form the fulcrum in the definition of Soviet foreign policy.

This critique did not, I hasten to add, mention Cuba by name, but the implications are so powerful that Ernesto and I independently came to the same conclusion and almost at once, that Cuba was very much the intended diplomatic target. The burden of recent Soviet commentaries, and the burden of the Soviet position under Gorbachev, is they, too, are making an evaluation of the Cuban Revolution at thirty. They are, in effect, warning the Cubans that any further calls for mobilization without real development have limits, and that those limits will be reached at a point in time when Soviet sacrifice far exceeds Cuban returns on investment.

We are in for a period of very rapid change in Soviet-Cuban relations. But

I daresay within the next several years, the consequences of the things that Jaime and Ernesto have been talking about will bear interesting, if bitter, fruit.

"A regime has to work very hard to have such a backward spin in its economy over three decades."

And with that, I simply would like to thank both Jaime and Ernesto for their outstanding presentations. Their hard labors have served to stimulate my soft speculations. Thank you and good morning.

Questions & Answers

José Hernández, Georgetown University: Why do you think Castro has been able to maintain power for thirty years? Why Castro, as opposed to other political leaders in Cuba this century?

Dr. Suchlicki: I think there is a combination of factors. Number one, Fidel is a very astute and able leader, so you are not confronting the same leadership that Cuba has had in the past. He is no Batista. Second, I think the Cubans placed their faith in Fidel Castro after they overthrew Batista to an extent never seen before in Cuba. Following that was an enormous disillusionment. The Cuban forces haven't been able to rally behind any other political leader or to even think of any other. Third, there is an apparatus similar to the Soviet apparatus in terms of repression and control in Cuba. But alone, that does not explain the phenomenon of Fidel Castro's permanence in power. Fourth, there is an outside power—the Soviet element—supporting Fidel Castro in Cuba. Basically those are the elements. I'm sure there are more. Ernesto?

Mr. Betancourt: Well, there was an initial situation when Castro was extremely popular. He had managed to grab all the means of control of the society, in terms of access to wealth, power, and communications. He had all those resources in his hands, with the consent of the Cuban population. He was very popular in the first part of his regime. Nobody would question that he could have won an election if it was held at that time. So you have the habits of obedience created as well as the overwhelming repressive apparatus to keep him in power.

I believe one explanation as to why Castro has managed to stay in power

is he has given the Cuban society a collective sense of self-importance. What country in Latin America has sent troops to Africa? It's a power that has to be dealt with. Cubans feel Cuba is now an important country, and this appeal is psychologically important, although politically it is not so evident. It plays a role in why people still continue to support Castro.

But we are beginning to see increasing indications of a type of revolutionary fatigue. For example, in the last few months, the Cuban police has deployed six anti-riot helicopters. There's a song that was very popular in Cuba; Castro even alluded to it, because we have been broadcasting it. This song was number one on the Cuban hit parade up to October. Its title is "This Man is Crazy," and the description is one that fits Fidel very well, although it does not mention him by name. How it sneaked by the censorship is really hard to understand. It's even a Cuban group that sings it.

Then an incident took place at a movie theater, the Pagnet Theatre. They were showing a movie that was very attractive to young people, and there was a documentary in which Castro appeared, and when he appeared, the youngsters started singing "This Man is Crazy." The police came and arrested 100 people. Of course, the song is no longer on the hit parade.

These symptoms of the alienation of young people are very important. We had a video cassette that was made by the Cuban police. Jaime and Irving have seen this. The Cuban police felt that the situation with the generation from 14 to 27 was getting so desperate they had to do something about it. They produced this documentary to show the Party leadership why young people were disenchanted with the Revolution, and that it was a problem that could not be dealt with exclusively by using police repression.

So there are some symptoms this ability of Castro to control the situation is now being challenged. You may know of the proposal asking Castro to hold a plebiscite similar to the one by Pinochet. This was very threatening to Castro, and we are now getting information from our interviews with people coming out of Cuba that in the graffiti on the walls in Havana, people are painting "no." Simply, "no." I can imagine Fidel's reaction whenever he sees a "no" on the wall. It's something that has to give him cause for concern.

Dr. Horowitz: Let me add one item. This question is often asked as a sign of the success of Cuban communism. However, durability at the personal level is really symptomatic of failure. If one says a regime can survive for thirty years, with a normal turnover in leadership, then one is dealing with the legitimate success of a regime. But when, as in Cuba, the situation is one person remaining in power and control for all those years, this is a statement of

failure in the institutional sense.

It is important to avoid a simplistic response to Cuba and say: "Well, there must be something tremendous going on there, the same person is in charge all these years." In a democratic society, the idea of a person being in office for thirty years is viewed as a danger signal to the character of the society itself. It is often viewed as a systemic breakdown. For example, in the United States, the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to four terms was basic cause for the present constitutional prohibition on any president serving more than two terms in office. As in any political estimation, we have to critically distinguish systemic failure from personal survival.

"It is important to avoid a simplistic response to Cuba and say: 'Well, there must be something tremendous going on there, the same person is in charge all these years.'"

Don Shannon, Los Angeles Times: Both the speakers seemed to miss the point Castro always makes, that medical services and education have been the great boons of the Revolution. Even though the Cuban American National Foundation brought out the complaints of the people about health service, and you can always say education doesn't mean much if you can't read what you want, haven't those things had an effect?

Mr. Betancourt: Yes, there is the factor of improved health and education, particularly the discrepancy between availability of these services in Havana and the countryside, as well as improved employment. These are concrete things the government has done for the population, and people are grateful. But there is a rule of politics: what have you done for me lately. And the younger generation—and this is the key problem they face, the people who were born after Castro came to power—do not necessarily compare with the past. They have newer levels of aspirations, and the system is incapable of satisfying them.

It's not that you want to ignore it, but, as Irving mentioned, Cuba had a substantial level of development at the time Castro came to power. Many people know nothing about the Cuban past and only look at absolute present levels, not realizing that Cuba started from a very high base. There is a study by Carmelo Mesa-Lago comparing the progress of Costa Rica with the progress of Cuba in these thirty years, which indicates Costa Rica has made prog-

ress equal or better than Cuba in many of these areas, without losing their freedom. This is a very important component, because the total life of a person is not merely to have food and medical care—you can get that at the zoo, where they take care of the animals. Man expects something more than that in his life.

"Many people know nothing about the Cuban past and only look at absolute present levels, not realizing that Cuba started from a very high base."

PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

Jiri Valenta

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I had the strong impression when I visited Cuba in September 1988 that Castro has been able to preserve among the Cuban population and his many supporters the image of a dictator who is relatively independent from the Soviet Union. In Havana, unlike in East Berlin, you don't see a wall, you don't see posters with Gorbachev or Stalin or Brezhnev. The Soviet presence is minuscule and not very obvious.

I believe, like the previous speakers, Castro's regime has failed in terms of economic development. Yet with his tremendously exuberant personality, Castro has been able to lessen the appearance of his economic dependency on the USSR. Castro has succeeded in ruling Cuba for thirty years because of his

leadership skills, and also because of the Leninist instruments of power. You might call it "tropical socialism," but the Party exists in Cuba, like it does in Eastern Europe and elsewhere Communists rule, and it prevents dissent from becoming a political force. Nonetheless, Castro has been able to package himself primarily as a nationalist, a man who has stood up to "American imperialism," as he calls it, and even to the Soviet leaders, while still capitalizing on Soviet-assisted military involvements in Africa and Central America. Selling this ability through various channels is one of the factors that has helped him to remain in power.

Now to the subject of Soviet-Cuban relations. I would describe the alliance at the moment as a troubled alliance. I will suggest there are four basic points we have to consider when we analyze this particular alliance.

First, there is the past U.S. failure to grapple with the Cuban threat, which is caused by our misunderstanding of the complex and multifaceted Cuban role in the Soviet alliance system. We have been unable to understand the nature of the threat and this has influenced American foreign policy-making. Second, most of us have still not properly identified Cuba's considerably autonomous role in the Soviet alliance system. Cuba has never been a subervient and compliant Soviet ally. Third, at this time there is no immediate threat to the overall strategic alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba, but on a tactical level there exists a number of disagreements that were never there before. True, in the 1960s Cuba was an unruly alliance partner, but at that time there existed a disagreement only about foreign policy, not domestic politics. At the same time, and this is the fourth point, U.S. policy-makers should not be indifferent to the existing tactical differences between the Soviet Union and Cuba, as they can become strategic differences.

"The U.S. misunderstanding of Cuba's complex role in the Soviet alliance has led us to try to deal primarily with the Soviet Union regarding Cuba's international conduct instead of with Cuba."

The U.S. misunderstanding of Cuba's complex role in the Soviet alliance has led us to try to deal primarily with the Soviet Union regarding Cuba's international conduct instead of with Cuba. In the early stage of the U.S.-Cuba relationship, in particular, U.S. policy-makers were above all concerned with the Soviet threat to U.S. physical security via Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a very good example, as was the mini-crisis in 1970 over naval fa-

cilities at Cienfuegos. In general, policy-makers perceived Cuban activism in the Third World simply as an extension of Soviet power. They did not concentrate on the complex alliance that exists between the Soviet Union and Cuba, in which Cuba is sometimes autonomous and sometimes makes inputs into Soviet foreign policy.

It is very important to identify Cuba as an autonomous actor in the Soviet alliance. Although Cuba must agree with the Soviet Union on major foreign policy issues, it has considerable room for autonomy in pursuing its own strategic goals, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. The degree of Cuban autonomy differs from case to case. In Angola, in the initial phase, the Cubans were an autonomous actor. Then the Soviets were dragged into an intervention in some respects by the Cubans. In Ethiopia, two years later, however, the Cubans acted as a Soviet proxy. So the Cubans, in great part because of Fidel Castro's personality, have the very unique ability to be at times proxy and at times autonomous actor, or what I would call "junior ally."

Another role Cuba has exercised successfully has been as broker between the Soviet Union and new Leninist forces in the Third World, be it in Africa, the Caribbean, or even in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In the Caribbean and Africa primarily, Castro has performed invaluable service to the Soviet Union, actually contributing to Soviet decision-making by establishing and maintaining what he calls a "principal relationship" with the key players in various national liberation movements and bringing them into the Soviet orbit.

"Another role Cuba has exercised successfully has been as broker between the Soviet Union and new Leninist forces in the Third World..."

In devising a coherent U.S. strategy, we have to cope with Cuba's multiple functions, particularly now as the Soviet Union and Cuba seem to disagree tactically on a number of issues. Again, the disagreements are not just over revolution or revolutionary opportunities or compromises with imperialism—in other words, the foreign policy issues that divided them in the 1960s—but also issues of domestic politics. Fidel Castro rejects all three of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform concepts, *perestroika* (restructuring), *glasnost* (openness), and *novoe myshlenie* (new thinking).

In Castro's opinion, Gorbachev's *perestroika* is a return to capitalism and has no place in a Communist society. It is not only an ideological issue for

Castro but an issue of personal power. Here I am basing some of my observations on a conversation several U.S. scholars and I had with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Cuba in September 1988. Rodríguez believes that *perestroika* has an uncertain future. When we talked about the economic policies of the 1920s, which Gorbachev uses as a model for *perestroika*, Rodríguez said something about *perestroika* being a "return to capitalism." This, of course, contradicts the very ideological underpinnings of *perestroika*, which Gorbachev sees as a return to real Leninism.

"In Castro's opinion, Gorbachev's perestroika is a return to capitalism and has no place in a Communist society. It is not only an ideological issue for Castro but an issue of personal power."

The Cuban leaders see little difference between Gorbachev's economic experiment and the Dubcek example of 1968 and the Chinese example, and they dislike it. While Castro has harshly criticized and denoted all those in his government who have admitted the validity of the capitalist experience of the socialist countries, Gorbachev has promoted them. In the Soviet Union, some of the so-called economic revisionists who applauded the Czech reforms nineteen years ago are now in Gorbachev's government. To Fidel Castro, *glasnost* means a "return to bourgeois freedoms." *Glasnost* is also viewed in Havana as an attempt to undermine the Soviet-Cuban relationship. It reminds the Cuban leadership of the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Polish experiment with Solidarity in 1980-1981. It causes confusion within the Cuban elite, as General del Pino reported in an extensive interview with Radio Martí, published by the Cuban American National Foundation.

During our discussion, Rodríguez pointed to the example of *Moscow News* (which is apparently no longer available in Cuba), describing it as a "counter-revolutionary newspaper." From my experience in Havana, I would say it is almost impossible to find Soviet newspapers there. The situation is similar in East Germany, where distribution of the Soviet newspaper *Sputnik* was forbidden in November 1988. I can mention some other Leninist countries that do not like *glasnost* and *perestroika*—Romania, Czechoslovakia by and large, North Korea—and some Leninist-oriented regimes as well—Nicaragua, to a certain extent Angola, even South Yemen—and, of course, national liberation movements like the ANCL. The leaders of these countries feel *glasnost* will undermine the stability of "proper" Communist regimes. To put it

differently, *glasnost* is helping the class enemy, as Castro hinted. It opens a Pandora's box and provides a climate in which Soviet analysts can freely criticize the Soviet and Cuban economies. It is incredible what the Russians are saying and I can assure you that not only the Cubans, but the East Germans and the whole transnational coalition of the opponents of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, are upset about it.

There is a third level of Soviet-Cuban disagreement about the new thinking in foreign affairs and that is about regional conflicts. New thinking in Russia is used sometimes in reference to both domestic and foreign affairs, but here I primarily use the Gorbachevian definition which implies there is something wrong with the old thinking in foreign affairs. But in the language of Fidel Castro, the new thinking borders on betraying the Communist commonwealth. In my judgment, Castro was forced to compromise in Angola by the Soviets, who were applying the principles of new thinking to this regional conflict. If Castro were to believe the new thinking was a clever deception to dupe the West, he would support it, believing the Communist camp would win at the negotiation table what they lost in the military field. However, as it stands, Castro is afraid some of the achievements of the socialist camp would be lost through bargaining.

"While Castro has harshly criticized and denoted all those in his government who have admitted the validity of the capitalist experience of the socialist countries, Gorbachev has promoted them."

It is interesting Castro has invited Najibullah, the Afghan leader, and some other doubters of the new thinking to Havana. Najibullah went to Cuba in the summer of 1988 and was awarded a high order of the Cuban government. The Cubans also signed a new treaty with this man who, in my judgment, is basically going to have to resign by February 15th or be killed by the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. I think it was an important Cuban gesture of defiance against the Soviets. Castro also invited the Cambodian leader Heng Samrin, who got the same VIP treatment. These are both people the Soviets are not too enthusiastic about dealing with because they know they will probably not stay in power too long. The bottom line is Castro believes Gorbachev's conciliatory approach toward regional conflicts can be, in the long run, extremely detrimental to the Communist camp.

Of course, the new Soviet policies also must cause him to question the level

of the Soviet commitment to Cuba in the 1990s. The only game in town for Castro and the only one he knows is revolution. The Soviets played the game in the 1970s, when Castro convinced them about the relevancy of Ché Guevara's thought and his own revolutionary notions about Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Now, with the increasing criticism by Soviet analysts and leaders about the cost of supporting Leninist regimes, Castro is afraid there will be nothing significant in the future he can really offer to the Soviet leadership that will warrant their continued unwavering support for his regime.

"The bottom line is Castro believes Gorbachev's conciliatory approach toward regional conflicts can be, in the long run, extremely detrimental to the Communist camp."

The bottom line here is tactical differences do exist between Moscow and Havana, without threatening their strategic alliance, at least in the short term. Even such tactical differences, however, might have serious consequences for U.S. policy-making. I am not arguing here like those enthusiasts who believe with the age of *perestroika* and *glasnost* upon us we should open up to every Communist regime, we should have a dialogue with everybody, including Castro. On the contrary, my conclusion is quite different. But we should cautiously support *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union. After all, an internal mellowing of communism has been an objective of American foreign policy since George Kennan wrote his important article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. It's happening and it's of tremendous historical significance.

"Because of Cuba's policies, we should resist even more vigorously that regime, while helping to introduce glasnost via Radio Martí and TV Martí."

At the same time, in Cuba we should apply the policy of differentiation we used successfully in Eastern Europe for thirty years. We cannot open up and support regimes like Castro's which do not accept even a modest degree of reform and openness. Because of Cuba's policies, we should resist even more vigorously that regime, while helping to introduce *glasnost* via Radio Martí and TV Martí. We must also try to play on the vulnerabilities of the Cuban

regime, because I believe Fidel Castro's rule, for a number of reasons, is coming to its end.

Thank you very much.

Questions & Answers

Raymond Duncan, SUNY-Rochester: Much is being made of the shift in Soviet foreign policy towards "new thinking" and political solutions to regional conflicts, and Castro having less to offer the Soviets, leading, in the long run, to a decline in Soviet subsidies and so forth.

With that in mind, though, how do you play that off the other benefits gained by the Soviets by being in Cuba, mainly the intelligence installations? Because there is that Soviet bilateral competition with the United States that is still served by the Cuban assets.

Dr. Valenta: I don't see any strong evidence, any evidence whatsoever, the Soviets are actually cutting the subsidies to Cuba, and I think Ernesto would agree with me. What we know is the Soviets told Castro after 1990 they will no longer subsidize the oil he is selling to other parties and from which the Cubans are making a lot of money. Even though there is a correlation between what the Cubans do for the Soviets and what the Soviets do for the Cubans in the Soviet-Cuban alliance, the economic payoff is not the main one.

For Castro, the ideological payoff and the personal payoff, the power payoff, are much more important. He was making money, it was a good business, but he also believed in it and did it willingly, not because the Soviets forced him into it. In fact, he would try to force them to pursue his wishes. It has been a mutual arrangement.

As to your second question, I think that the Soviets will try to maintain the military intelligence aspect of the alliance. The military intelligence facilities are extremely important to the Soviets. They are the largest outside the Soviet Union and they are a symbol of power. This of course does not alter the argument that the United States should encourage *glasnost* and *perestroika* as long as they help to mellow the Leninist orthodoxy. In Cuba, in the long run, the outcome is uncertain. If history provides any lessons, you cannot reverse Leninism by any other means but military power. We saw it in Hungary in 1919, during the revolution of Bela Kun. We saw it in Grenada, which had not exactly evolved into a Communist regime, but it was heading there. We saw

the beginnings of change in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Hungary in 1959, but they were not completed. Soviet tanks prevented us from knowing what would happen.

"...I think that the Soviets will try to maintain the military intelligence aspect of the alliance."

So we have to be extremely careful here, and if we are not prepared to use force in Cuba, I think the best way to deal with the problem is to play on the Cuban vulnerabilities, to try to introduce elements of *glasnost* and use economic instruments, the boycotts, but as long as Fidel Castro or his successor maintains interventionist forces abroad and denies the Cuban people basic freedoms, I don't think we should be ready to do anything to open up our relations with Cuba.

But back to military intelligence facilities, they will stay even if the *perestroika* advocates take over.

Melvyn Oman, University of Maryland: It seems to me that as you described Castro's reaction, he gives a lot more credibility to *perestroika* and *glasnost* than do serious American students of the Soviet economy. For example, *perestroika* thus far has been largely on paper, and, in fact, the GNP of the Soviet Union has remained exactly where it was, if not a little lower, than when it all started.

And *glasnost*, while it does permit people now to know more in print or otherwise about the long queues in retail shops, it doesn't permit any discussion of anything fundamental, such as another opposition party. And if this is so, why is Castro so fearful about this?

Dr. Valenta: That's a very fundamental question which demands further explanation of the terminology. *Perestroika* refers to a restructuring of the economic system to make it more decentralized and market-oriented. *Glasnost*, the second concept with which we are infatuated, really means openness. It is used as a means to help *perestroika* prevail in the long term. *Glasnost* is a means to get support from the intellectuals, as well as help to have open dialogue in a more open press in order to get rid of all the bureaucrats who are still supporting the "old thinking," if you will, the stagnation of the Brezhnev era.

I would disagree with you about the influence *glasnost* is having on the Communist world. I think it has been having a profound influence, and surely Castro takes it seriously. For example, the Soviets have conceded that Soviet

foreign policy has been dominated by military interventions caused by ideological concerns. They have also admitted the crimes and excesses by the KGB, to give a few examples. New figures that I have seen in the Soviet press about the victims of the Stalinist era now match those of the historian Robert Conquest. *Glasnost* has enabled Soviet commentators and historians to re-examine their past openly.

"Castro's conservatism is extreme to the point he supports the opponents of perestroika in the Soviet Union."

What you see now in the Soviet press vindicates a number of studies of the Soviet Union based on the valid assumption that totalitarian power produces tragic consequences for the Soviet society and the world. *Glasnost* cannot be abruptly eradicated. Even if Ligachev takes over tomorrow, there is a public record he will have to deal with. The efficacy of *glasnost* was proven several weeks ago when the East German leadership became very upset at the appearance of articles blaming Stalin for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, something you and I teach our students about, but which is not permitted to be taught, remember, in Communist societies. So *glasnost* is already having profound effects. I don't know where it is going to go. I don't think it will make the Soviet Union a Jeffersonian society, but it is surely something that deserves our support.

On *perestroika*, I agree with you. *Perestroika* has not yet produced tangible results. Actually, we don't yet have an example—with the possible exception of China—whereby there have been short-run positive economic benefits resulting from reforms in a Communist society. Indeed, the Soviet economic situation is even worse than it was under Brezhnev. But what the Soviets are now saying, and I think they are right, is it is due in part to their overextended empire, a past foreign policy activism for which they are now paying a heavy price. As Gorbachev said, they are paying a heavy bill for Afghanistan. And, of course, what he did not say is that they are paying even more for Cuba.

So, regardless of whether the reforms in the U.S.S.R. succeed—and I will leave it up to them, because we can influence it only marginally—they are still viewed by Castro as a threat, primarily because of the aspects of *glasnost*. Moreover, as Castro sees it, in China, but also in the Soviet Union, people are allowed to become rich, and the private producers who are emerging are viewed by Castro as ideologically incompatible with his regime.

The Cuban economic situation is worse than that of the Soviet Union, and I think *perestroika* could only help them, but that's not what Fidel believes. He believes that *perestroika* and *glasnost* would impinge upon his personal power. He will not tolerate that as long as he's alive. He told that to several people.

Castro's conservatism is extreme to the point he supports the opponents of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. What Ligachev said in the summer before he was demoted was almost based on a speech Fidel Castro made several days earlier. *For all these reasons, if we support Castro we may help to undermine Gorbachev.* Our policy should be to support *glasnost* in Cuba, which means support for Radio Martí, and wait until there is a change in the Cuban government.

Speaker: You say Fidel Castro's regime is about to come to an end. If this were to be the case, what type of personality would the Russians want to replace him with?

Dr. Valenta: I didn't mean to say tomorrow will be the end of the Castro regime. I am suggesting the personal dictatorship of Fidel Castro is being threatened, and Castro even said it himself in December, not only from the West but also from the East.

"...I see the signs of impending change in the Cuban system, Cuba being embattled by its own friends and criticized publicly even by the Soviet press."

When Castro thinks about his regime, he thinks above all about himself. When the Soviets think about a Leninist regime, like Stalin, they think of a regime with personalities that come and go. So the Soviets already think about the post-Castro era, who will be the Cuban reformer. Fidel Castro doesn't fit into the era of new thinking. He is an anachronism. That is what I am saying. I cannot tell you as a political scientist where and when he will be replaced. Who knows? I am suggesting that I see the signs of impending change in the Cuban system, Cuba being embattled by its own friends and criticized publicly even by the Soviet press. That is very unprecedented.

But things can be reversed. The opponents of *perestroika* can be defeated in the Soviet Union. The Soviet consumers are asking Gorbachev Walter Mondale's question: Where's the beef? There ain't any beef in Moscow, and that is

what the opponents of Gorbachev are using against him. The policy is not yet working. You saw his speech last week. He clearly talked about the opponents in the regime, and Fidel Castro is betting on those people. He has seen coups in Moscow before.

"... Castro has tried for the last several months to forge a coalition of anti-Gorbachev dissidents within the international Communist movement."

We also know Castro talked privately to Latin American leaders and criticized Gorbachev for his lack of revolutionary experience, for being naive, and suggested his policies are destabilizing the Soviet Union. In part it might be true. You see the troubles in Armenia and the Baltic Republics. To some Communist hardliners in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, Fidel Castro is a realist. They believe one should not fiddle with Leninist orthodoxy. Gorbachev is doing something very unpredictable, so any prediction at this time would be off the wall. Fidel Castro might still survive politically.

Georgie Anne Geyer: Could you expand a little bit on Castro and his relationship with Afghanistan?

Dr. Valenta: What I was suggesting to you is Castro has tried for the last several months to forge a coalition of anti-Gorbachev dissidents within the international Communist movement. As you know, in the past, Castro kept his hands off Afghanistan. In fact, the Cuban diplomats appeared to be in disagreement with the Soviet intervention in 1980.

"... Cuba is acting as the last bastion of orthodox communism."

Yet, in the summer of 1988, when the Soviets tried to convince Najibullah to come to terms with some factions of the freedom fighters and his future was very uncertain, Castro began to actively support the Najibullah regime, and this happened after the identification cards were given, both in Russian and Farsi, for the Afghan officials to leave Afghanistan for the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1988, Castro invited Najibullah and concluded with him a non-aggression treaty and gave him his support, as he did also to the

Cambodian leader Heng Samrin, both of whom are now forced by the Soviets to negotiate with their adversaries. Also important was Castro's decision not to go to the South Korean Olympics. Principles are more important for us than medals, he said. Thus, Cuba is acting as the last bastion of orthodox communism. I consider the building of an anti-Gorbachev coalition, which basically disagrees with new thinking implications, to be very significant and completely overlooked by many analysts.

Thank you.

CASTRO: THE "KNOWABLE" DICTATOR

Georgie Anne Geyer

Georgie Anne Geyer was a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News for twelve years and is now a syndicated columnist. She is the author of several books, including The New Latins, The 100 Years War, and The Young Russians. Ms. Geyer has received many awards and honors, including the Maria Moors Cabot Award—the oldest international prize in journalism—and the Overseas Press Club Award. Her historical biography of Fidel Castro is scheduled to be published in 1990.

Who is he really? Why, after these thirty long years, does the world still know him so little?

Of all the fascinating things that have happened to me in the last four years working on this book—which seems more like forty or fifty years—one of them occurred in a restaurant here in Washington, where I had taken three Cuban diplomats to lunch. At the beginning of the lunch, they said, "Well, Georgie Anne, we know you're going to write a lot about Fidel's personal life, and what he is like personally and psychologically," and I said yes. They said, "Well, we're not interested in that, and neither are the Cuban people." So I plied them with a couple bottles of wine. Soon they were asking, "Did you say his father was from Spain? Did you say he was married? You say he had children?" And at the end of it, a real chill went over me, because I thought, here are these people—Cuban officials—and this man has controlled every single minute

and action of their lives. And they still don't know who he is.

I watched Castro; I guess that's what got me started on this book. I had met him personally on four occasions. I had watched the other charismatic leaders, dictators, whatever we want to call him—Castro, Qaddafi, Khomeini—and I kept asking myself, "Who are they really? What are they doing? What is the spell they weave over their people?"

Now on this 30th anniversary, I read all the articles saying Castro is "unpredictable," he is "mellowing," he is "mysterious." Ladies and gentlemen, I simply don't recognize that as the man I have been, in effect, living with, night and day, for the last four years. If there is anything Fidel Castro is, he is predictable. If there is anything that has not happened to him in thirty years, it is that he has mellowed. He is as predictable as the sun rising, and he is not mysterious at all. If there's anything I found in my writing, it was that after, say, the first year of work, there were no surprises at all! He is absolutely knowledgeable—and yet we don't know him. So I started this book, this little madness of mine, to answer those questions. Instead of a midlife crisis, a miserable love affair or an illegitimate child...I had this book.

Castro did not, of course, collaborate. He wasn't even going to let me into Cuba! So how do you deal with a leader like Fidel—and I call him both Fidel and Castro in the book, Fidel before he comes to power, Castro after he comes to power. How do you find out about him?

"If there is anything Fidel Castro is, he is predictable."

Well, to my luck, I discovered after about two years of work, I did it the right way. With a leader like Castro, like Fidel, you have to close in from the peripheries. If you try to go at him directly in Cuba, you'll get nothing. There are no secrets to be found in Cuba.

So I started a list, which grew to about 800 people in twenty-eight countries. My staff then began going to those countries, interviewing these people, and classifying all the materials. I then went over about 600 books and 600 to 700 periodicals in various languages, mostly Spanish and Portuguese, but also German and Russian.

Then I began pulling together from these peripheries answers to "Who is this man?" One of the many brilliant things about Castro's approach is he makes everyone think they know him. Everybody knows Castro. Everybody knows his tap on the shoulder. He eats their hors d'oeuvres at parties. He

knows about their countries. I had a very high military leader in Salvador the other day admit to me that he had his picture taken with Castro, and he was so pleased. Castro has this incredible talent, one of his many, of making everyone feel they know him when he remains in Max Weber's phrase in "The Charismatic Authority," totally unknowable. He depends upon distance—complete and utter distance and remoteness—for his power.

Let me go over some of the little voyages and odysseys that I've taken for this book, and some of the things I've discovered about his life. One of the first places I went to find out about his background was Galicia, in the north of Spain, where his father came from. In a beautiful valley there, I found his uncle, Salustiano, in a very primitive stone house. I went to see Fidel's father's house, which was also very primitive and only an hour, incidentally, from Franco's house. One of the many things people don't know is Fidel and Franco, though they never met, were very close. They exchanged gifts and messages, usually something about how to get the *gringos*. There was a community of dictators between them. They were both Spanish *caudillos*.

Anyway, I find Uncle Salustiano, like most *gallegos*, very closed. Eventually I did get into the house and he and his wife warmed a little bit to me. I introduced myself, told them what I was doing, and then said what a beautiful valley it was. And he looked at me with that closed, suspicious, *gallego* look and said, "*No es feo!*" I thought that was a very interesting little insight into the closed background of the people Fidel comes from.

Castro's father, Angel, left Galicia—paid off by an upper-class Spaniard boy who didn't want to fight in the war of 1898—came to Cuba, fought against the *gringos*, went back to his impoverished Galicia, and then returned to Cuba. Now right there you have an incredible amount of anti-Americanism already built in!

Angel Castro was a very aggressive man. He went to Eastern Cuba, to a wild area, got some land and started doing what is called "moving the fences." He had one of the typical round Spanish land grants, and every night he and his men would go out on their horses and move the fences out a little bit more, until he had a whole lot of land.

They were very gross and vulgar people. They would eat standing up in this very poor house they had. Every once in a while someone will still come from Cuba and say, "Oh, I was with Fidel at this big reception. You know, it's interesting...he eats standing up...it must be because he's in such a hurry!" Well, the Castro family always ate standing up and they also had chickens and pigs and everything all over the house.

He was illegitimate, as were his immediate siblings. His mother was the family maid. After a while, because his parents wanted to put Fidel in a Catholic school at age six, the priest forced them to marry—which they did. The illegitimacy parts very important to Fidel. One of the many books I found that is not well-known is a little biography in Spanish, in which his mother cooperated the first year of Castro's reign. They quote Castro as talking about his parents at the time of his birth as a "happy matrimony." Of course, they were not married until six years later—and they were not that happy.

But they were a very aggressive and very smart people. They lived right next door to United Fruit, which was interesting enough, and Angel used to take the machines from United Fruit, which were painted yellow, and repaint them. Mr. Hodgkins, who was the director of United Fruit, would come over, and they would have a bottle of cognac together and he'd say, "Don Angel, I think that's my tractor over there." Angel would say, "No, no, that's my tractor. You see it's painted green," or whatever. Then they would drink a little more cognac and Mr. Hodgkins—who told us this on his deathbed in Miami—would go and take a knife and scrape the paint off and would see the yellow United Fruit paint underneath. Then they would both laugh and Hodgkins would take the tractor home. These stories go on and on and on.

At any rate, Angel Castro was "*miu vivo*." They wanted Fidel, who was a very smart and violent little boy—he never changed in any of these patterns—to have the best education. So they sent him to Catholic schools and the Jesuit high school at Belén.

"In all of my studying of him, in all of the interviewing, I couldn't find one single instance of Fidel Castro showing any interest whatsoever in democracy."

One of the many people I talked to from Belén was Fidel's favorite priest, Father Armando Llorente, a brilliant and very nice man who is now in Miami. He told me about Fidel's fascination with sports at Belén. He said, "You know, he became a very good basketball player, but he never adopted basketball until it was fashionable. But then I had to put a light in the basketball court, because he would play all night." I asked him if he ever saw Fidel praying—this was, after all, a Jesuit high school—and he said, "Once in a while I would see him in the chapel praying," and then said with a smile, "I know what he was praying for—he was praying to win!"

Then came the university years, the gangster years. I remember one day in Madrid I was talking to Rafael Diaz-Balart, Fidel's brother-in-law, and he said, "I was in my apartment one day in Havana and suddenly there was this wild knocking on the door, and there was Fidel," and Fidel said to him, "Rafael, Rafael, let me in. I've just killed Leonel Gomez." Gomez was one of the university student leaders, but Fidel hadn't killed him. He had just shot him.

"I don't see anything in all of Fidel Castro's life that shows any interest in ideology at all, except as a technique to power..."

Fidel was a gangster in these years. In all of my studying of him, in all of the interviewing, I couldn't find one single instance of Fidel Castro showing any interest whatsoever in democracy. The idea that he could have been a democrat is simply absurd. What he did from the moment he got to the university, and even earlier, was to organize the "outs," the marginalized people of society, in a total and vertical power structure, always the same power structure, and always himself at the top.

At Belén, his heroes were Hitler, Mussolini, and Primo de Rivera, the Spanish Falangist. He used to walk around with a Spanish copy of *Mein Kampf* under his arm, and he had maps on his wall showing the victories of the Axis across Europe. This was, of course, in the 1930s.

Now, it's easy to say Fidel Castro was a Fascist, a Fascist sympathizer, or a Nazi. But that is missing the whole point. Castro, in his generation of aggressive, violent young Cubans of his type—there were many other types, of course—was interested in techniques to power. And that brings up another important point: I don't see anything in all of Fidel Castro's life that shows any interest in ideology at all, except as a technique to power—and I think his early fascination with Fascism shows that very clearly. He was not a Fascist. Fidel was always and singularly a *Fidelistia*.

What about the women in his life? Well, it was at this point, after the university, he married for his first and only time. But whom does he marry? He marries a pretty blonde with sweet green eyes, Mirra Diaz-Balart, who is none other than the daughter of the lawyer for both Batista and United Fruit! Mirra had the same exact psychological profile and pattern as the three other women he proposed to. They were all very pretty, mostly blonde, but some dark-haired. They were all very Americanized. They all spoke perfect English. They were all upper-class and from families who had fought on the Cuban side in

the War for Independence.

Naty Revuelta, the second one, worked for the American Embassy and an American oil company. She was this gorgeous woman whom Fidel wanted to marry after he had broken with Mirta. She has a daughter by him named Alina, now a dissident who wants to leave Cuba. There was another woman in Mexico, Isabel Custodio, to whom he proposed during the repatriation. But Isabel was smart. Fidel wanted her to go with him on the Gramma, but she was from a very upper-class Spanish family, and after hearing that for about two days she left that same day and married a very conservative Mexican.

"What he did at his Moncada trial and what he repeated in all of the trials afterwards, from that of Huber Matos on, was he turned the legitimacy of the court around."

Let me just pause here to tell you how I found some of these people. Isabel Custodio is a good example. In Teresa Casuso's book—she was with Fidel in Mexico—she mentions this woman named Lilia, to whom she had introduced Fidel. He was very smitten by her. She was a gorgeous sixteen-year-old, and he asked her to marry him. Well, now I had to find her! But I didn't even know her real name. Teresa Casuso is dead or dying, so Orlando Cárdenas, who had been with Fidel in Mexico and is now in Miami, told me her name is Isabel Custodio and her father was a Spanish Republican in Mexico.

So, how do you find Isabel Custodio? Well, I called a friend of mine in Bolivia whose wife was married to the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic in Mexico. He said, "There's a Spanish Republican Club in Mexico City, and they'll know where a man named Custodio is." So we went there, and they did. Mr. Custodio was now in Spain. So when I next went to Spain, I called him. He was in a little town outside of Madrid, and I went out to interview him. He gave me Isabel's address in Mexico, but since I couldn't go back to Mexico at this point, I called a friend of mine and asked him to contact Isabel Custodio and interview her. That is how we got hours of tapes on Isabel Custodio and her memories of Fidel, their love affair, and so on.

Another woman he was deeply involved with was Gloria Gaitán, the daughter of the great Jorge Eliécer Gaitán of Colombia, who was killed in the *Bogotazo* in 1948 when Fidel was there. Two years ago when I was in Colombia, I looked up Gloria. She wasn't that easy to find. A very handsome and nice woman in her fifties, Gloria at first did not want to talk about Castro, but she

ended up by not only talking to me for hours, but preparing tapes on all of her memories of her times in Cuba. To me, this kind of historic research, the difficulties of getting it, and doing it as a journalist—as a journalist who loves history—was thrilling. Gloria ended up, like most of the women, rather disillusioned with Castro. She told me how she had attended the anniversary of her father's death—they had a big celebration for him—and Castro did not come. When I asked her how that made her feel, she said, "Oh, he doesn't really care about people when he doesn't need them anymore. After all, he has lived 1000 years and I've lived fifty."

So these few women whom he was close to and serious with go in and out of his life. There's also a woman from Trinidad who is now called *La Mujer de Trinidad*. Her name is Dahlia. We finally tracked her down, too. She has five children by Fidel. Four of them are boys and they all have Alejandro, his middle name, somewhere in their names—which tells you something, as if we needed to know more, about his tremendous ego!

But these things are not easy to find. In fact, someone like Fidel Castro depends upon not being known. Now, just to go over quickly his life and some of the interesting things we found. In 1953, he attacks the Moncada barracks—a crazy, sacrificial attack. All of these young people are ones he organized from the marginalized groups; none of them belonged to the mainstream of Cuban society. They have this moving, moving, midnight meeting...singing Cuban songs and their own anthem. I'm not given to this kind of emotion, but a couple of times I was reading about that night—these innocent young people going to a sure death, and Fidel not caring at all because he's making his point in history—and I found tears coming to my eyes, because I knew what was going to happen to them, even if they didn't know. Well, we know what happened. They were just about all wiped out.

"One of the things about this man we must know about and study is how he has manipulated the myths and images of the 20th century."

But what was more interesting to me than Moncada itself, was the trial. And this is when I began to get some of my better insights into Castro. What he did at his Moncada trial and what he repeated in all of the trials afterwards, from that of Huber Matos on, was he turned the legitimacy of the court around.

He came in—remember, he's the one that has attacked the barracks, he's the one that's on trial—and he's in manacles and says, "Take these off. I have to

represent myself. I am a lawyer." So the Judge says, yes, he can defend himself. After they take off the handcuffs, he says, "I must also wear the black robes." And they said yes again. So then he immediately turns the entire court around, putting the military on trial. He is demanding that all of the things he is saying be held against *them*. It is one of the most extraordinary legal situations I can imagine through history. This was something he did over and over and over. Castro was creating new legitimacies constantly.

He was also creating myths. One of the things about this man we must know about and study is how he has manipulated the myths and images of the 20th century. The myth of "The Twelve"—it's just incredible how that comes up, the twelve apostles, the twelve people who landed when he came back from Mexico. But there were not twelve at all. There were eighty-some in the boat. There were eighteen, I think, who survived. But "The Twelve" goes all the way through. The Christ image, and it goes even to Nicaragua, *Los Doce*. The twelve leading Nicaraguans who come back from Costa Rica to save the country.

"What was he going to use for a modern philosophy to keep him in power forever? Communism is perfect. It is totalitarian; it is anti-American."

Then he enters Havana. The romantic side! The guilt side! One of the men who had fought with him said, "You know, everybody who had fought with the Revolution on our block did not have these signs in the window, the signs reading '*Fidel, Mi casa es tu casa*.' But the people who did not fight, who felt tremendously guilty, immediately put these signs up." Others who were with him those first eight days coming into Havana talked about the way he gave the people the opportunity now to be "with" the Revolution, saying they had fought the Revolution. They hadn't fought the Revolution, and they knew it. Castro had barely fought it himself. He was up in the mountains. But he knew how to instill this guilt and at the same time this hope into the people.

He came to the U.S. in the spring of 1959. Was he turned down? I have talked to everybody who is still alive who was with him. He wasn't turned down; he was treated extravagantly well. He had a beautiful lunch with the Secretary of State and saw the Vice-President for three hours that Sunday. I must tell you one story about Nixon when I interviewed him on this. He was talking about Castro and about those hours with him and I asked what he really thought of Castro at the time. And he got him right. If you look at the memo Nixon wrote,

which is public, he said he was not a democrat, that there were no democratic tendencies, and he would fear the worst. But he said Castro was a man "worth three hours of your time." I was just about to ask him about his debates with Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs when he said, "There were those debates with Kennedy in 1960. He knew about the Bay of Pigs, but he got up and attacked me and said that we were not dealing with Castro." Nixon said, "Kennedy knew, he had been briefed." Then he said, "You know, those debates were the only time the *New York Times* and Walter Lippmann praised me. The only time. They praised me because I was lying."

Now let me come to an end. Who is Fidel Castro? He is not a Communist. There's nothing Communist about him. He's a totalitarian Spanish *caudillo*. In a sense, the Cuban Revolution is the last war of Imperial Spain. When he came to power, Fascism was dead. What was he going to use for a modern philosophy to keep him in power forever? Communism is perfect. It is totalitarian; it is anti-American. He had to be anti-American if he was to be a world leader. It was perfect for him. He couldn't do anything else.

"...Fidel has made a massive identification with the aggressor..."

Fidel is The Communist Prince. He will go down in history along with Napoleon, Genghis Khan, Hitler, as one of the master tacticians and strategists. He is the supreme manipulator of the images of the modern world: television, radio, tape recorders; a man who created power out of powerlessness, who sent all of his even possible competitors to be killed or to prison or into exile.

If you look at the way he has moved out every social class from Cuba that could have questioned him, even questioned him, there's just no question about what kind of man he is. He is a traditional Spanish *caudillo* but one who came to power at a time in Latin America when the modern *caudillo* needed a totalitarian ideology to allow them to take power forever. My favorite word to describe Castro, which is not used very often or very well, is *monist*. He's one power, one leader, one belief.

Could Castro have been a democrat? No way. I think the best words on this came from Vernon Walters, who is a very canny analyst of people. I asked what he decided when he came back from Havana. He said, "It's very simple, Georgie Anne. We have nothing he wants. Had we recognized him, he would have been just like the President of the Dominican Republic."

Normalization? He doesn't want normalization, it would kill him. Normali-

zation is something to play with. He cannot be a leader in the world and be like the President of the Dominican Republic. How did he differ from other post-colonial leaders? This is something I'm still figuring out. All the other post-colonial leaders just wanted to be free of the colonial powers. Fidel doesn't want to be just free, he wants to destroy the metropole. I'm still working this through my mind, but I think it has to come with the imprecisions of cultural imperialism.

Another place I went was to a conference on cults. It was kind of a shot in the dark, yet it turned out to be very important. The cultic relationship, in which persons are intentionally induced to become dependent for all life's decisions, are not only with a Jim Jones. There's a very clear comparison here. At the conference, I was talking with Dr. Frederick Haack of Germany, a Lutheran thinker who has studied cult groups, and he said all the groups have the same formula: the saving formula, the world being saved, the holy master, the holy family, psychomutation, brainwashing, science, soul-watching. And he said, "Definitely compare the revolutionaries to cultists. Then, at the end, the leader does not even need to be seen, because he has such secret power."

"But today, the spell that he has woven over the Cuban people is, I am convinced, gone. It's been a long time. People are tired."

One of the best analysts at the psychological level is Dr. Fecundo Lima, a very talented Cuban-American psychiatrist in Baltimore. After a number of talks, he came out with the best analysis. He said Fidel has made a massive identification with the aggressor, mainly his father but also Batista and the Jesuits. His father was a *latifundista*; now Fidel has become, for all intents and purposes, the owner of Cuba. His father had a number of illegitimate children; Fidel now has quite a few of them. His father had a divided family, one legitimate and the other a bastard one; Fidel, more than anyone else in the history of Cuba, has divided the Cuban family. On the one hand, the revolutionaries, the legitimate family, on the other, the counter-revolutionaries, the bastards. He has substituted the religious practices of Jesuit teachers with his own brand of Marxism, his new religion, which he hoped would produce the "New Man," trying in this way to undo all the history of his illegitimate background. But today, the spell that he has woven over the Cuban people is, I am convinced, gone. It's been a long time. People are tired. Grenada marked

the change.

So, in writing in this book, I can only say I am finishing, in many ways, the same way as I started. I am stunned by all the information that is available about a man like this. I'm humbled by the amount of work it takes to get to him because he puts so much store on staying distant, on not being known. I'm stunned at the misperceptions of him and disturbed at the way our government still has no capacity to use the psychological knowledge of Castro and many other leaders to our benefit. I'm stunned at his incredible power for ongoing mischief-making.

"Will he change before he dies? No, he is an extraordinarily unified, stubborn man."

Is there anything nice about this man? Is there anything human? I thought about this for a long time. I really couldn't think of any nice, human qualities, and I'm not trying to be critical. But when you look at the strategic, the tactical, the political, the manipulative genius, it is simply incredible. He's always hundreds and hundreds of miles ahead of everyone else. Will he change before he dies? No, he is an extraordinarily unified, stubborn man. And we will see more Castros in the world who depend upon that distance and that mystery, and I hope in a very small way my book may help to unmask these people for our own good, for their own good, for whatever...just to know them before the situations go as far as this one.

In his *Playboy* interview of a couple of years ago, after he knew I had started this book, he was asked about his personal life and he said, to my amusement, "No, I will never talk about my personal life. But soon, without my collaboration, everything will be known."

Indeed it will. Thank you.

Questions & Answers

Ernesto Betancourt: Recently a group of intellectuals made a plea for a plebiscite in Cuba to determine whether Castro should stay. With the deep knowledge you have acquired about Fidel, how would he have reacted to this?

Ms. Geyer: There is no question in my mind that while publicly he would probably make fun of it, inside he would just be enraged. For one thing, through the years he has successfully wooed the intellectuals of the world, but recently it hasn't been going so well. I think there's much more knowledge now about him. But to have his legitimacy questioned is just intolerable for him. He can't have anything questioned.

"I give a lot of credibility to American guilt in terms of our policy in Latin America, and somebody like Castro knows how to play historic guilt like nothing in the world."

When I spoke with [Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael Rodríguez some years ago, he told me, "Fidel doesn't make all the decisions; we make decisions." And I asked him if he could think of a time when Fidel was questioned and didn't make the final decision. And Carlos Rafael thought, and he said no. And this was eight years into the Revolution. This is definitely a one-man show. This is political religion. Even Franco paved the way for the middle-class to take over. Fidel is going to fight until the day he dies. I think then we'll see a big change, but nothing until then.

Jack Skelly, *El Nuevo Día*: How do you explain the cover-up and the fascination of the major American media over thirty years of reflecting on Fidel Castro?

Ms. Geyer: I think it's a lot of things. It's Paul Hollander's *Political Pilgrims*, which is the best single analysis that I have seen of the intellectuals, the journalists, the people who are taken in by everything from Communist China to Russia to Nicaragua now, and, of course, for many years with Cuba. It's a fascination with the *caudillo* and, even more, fascination with revolution. You see it in Nicaragua today. There is no *caudillo*, but there is a revolution.

There is also an unwillingness to look at the other side. I was in Salvador all last week, and it's very obvious what the FMLN is doing now. They're stepping up their terrorism. I asked some of the journalists there why was not more done on the FMLN? And they said their editors weren't interested in it. It won't sell. They're only interested in U.S. policies and our guilt. I give a lot of credibility to American guilt in terms of our policy in Latin America, and somebody like Castro knows how to play historic guilt like nothing in the world.

And so I agree, I don't think the coverage over the years has been very good, from the time that Castro marched the same eighteen men past Herb Matthews, and he thought that Castro had a real army up there.

Speaker: When Fidel Castro rose to power, he passed himself off as a Jeffersonian Democrat to America. Did he try to embrace some semblance of opposition groups to form sort of a coalition kind of a government to consolidate power and then later do away with those who opposed his rule?

Ms. Geyer: Absolutely.

Speaker: Like the Sandinistas?

Ms. Geyer: Absolutely.

Speaker: Because this is the pattern that is being used today in the settlement of regional conflicts. The idea of a national reconciliation as a way to bring a political solution to the wars. There is a historical precedent with Castro.

Ms. Geyer: I think you are absolutely right. He talked all the time in the early days about unity, the unity of all the forces. He never excluded. It's the same unity being imposed upon the Sandinistas; the same unity imposed upon the Marxists in Salvador. Castro brought them to Havana and demanded unity in exchange for arms and support. This is exactly what he did at the beginning of the Revolution, when he was done with one group, he would force them out, like the middle-class, democratic, capitalistic economists. He just drove one out after the other with all kinds of reasons.

But I think that with Fidel in the early days, it was instinctive. He just knew—he has an incredible instinct for power. Later, he used the Marxism-Leninism, if we want it in quotes, which gave him the philosophy to do it, but instinctively he knew to do that.

But, yes, it is the same, and I don't believe it can work anywhere, because it never has. It just can't.

Speaker: Well, it's unfortunate that people in the government today are imposing these solutions on regional conflicts.

Ms. Geyer: It rather amazes me, too. We went through this once in Angola with those 1975 accords.

CUBA: THIRTY YEARS OF A REVOLUTIONARY FOREIGN POLICY

Mark Falcoff

Mark Falcoff is Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Inc., in Washington, D.C., where his specialty is Latin American issues. Dr. Falcoff is the author of Small Countries, Large Issues (1984), Modern Chile: A Critical History (1989), and co-editor, among other works, of The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean (1987).

At the time of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, it was not at all clear the country's foreign policy would be much different in the future than it had been for fifty years past. The United States was Cuba's most important market and source of foreign investment; it was the evident role model for economic development, lifestyles, and broader patterns of consumption. There were always arguments over sugar prices, over the sugar quota, over special privileges for American investors, over the rights and wrongs of the Guantánamo naval base, the conduct of American sailors on shore leave, and presumably there always would be. Anti-American feeling was the staple of Cuban politics and intellectual life, combined with the notion that somehow both countries would remain important to each other regardless of any conceivable circumstance.

Many who supported Castro's revolution against Batista expected some how Cuban politics would be utterly transformed after the latter's fall and hasty flight into exile. Nonetheless, there were few indications Cuba's world role would become the most revolutionary—indeed, perhaps the only truly revolutionary—feature of the new regime. Many Cuban politicians had made their careers on a promise to settle scores with the United States, but let the record show Castro was not one of them; on the morning of January 1, 1959, as far as most Americans knew, as far as most Cubans knew, his entire revolutionary program consisted of the restoration of Cuba's 1940 Constitution—a document by no means radical even by contemporary Latin American standards. Although many Cubans—by no means all of them leftists—regarded

the United States as responsible for Batista's seizure of power in 1952, or at least his permanence in office, nothing in the first pronouncements of the victorious revolutionaries suggested the prospect of recrimination. On the contrary, the new regime seemed determined to simply take over the bilateral relationship from Batista's diplomats and turn it to their own purposes. In any event, in those days Cuba did not occupy a major place in U.S. foreign policy deliberations, and the bilateral relationship—as is the case with so many small countries—was basically Castro's to determine.

During the first phase of the Revolution—that is, between Castro's seizure of power on New Year's Day in 1959 and his declaration in 1962 he was a "Marxist-Leninist"—relations with the United States worsened, beginning with a policy of expropriation of American firms and agricultural holdings, and concluding with a conflict over the refinement of Soviet oil. During this period, Cuban foreign policy could be likened to that of many other Latin American countries under the leadership of radical populists—Arbenz in Guatemala, Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil. The basic focus was the revindication of national grievances against the principal foreign power, but the theater of action was clearly the country itself. Whether during this period the United States acted wisely and well is a matter of political and historical opinion. What is certain is if the proximate causes of tension—property rights—were really what Castro cared about most, simply by standing his ground he would eventually have attained his purposes, particularly after the United States stood revealed as impotent and without local allies following the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"...there were few indications Cuba's world role would become the most revolutionary—indeed, perhaps the only truly revolutionary—feature of the new regime."

(Though many of his sympathizers or apologists often suggest Castro was "pushed" into the arms of the Soviet Union by the maladroit policies of the United States, the Cuban dictator himself does not subscribe to this view, and in fact explicitly repudiated it in his recent pronouncements to European journalists.)

After that event, of course, Cuba aligned more firmly with the Soviet Union, culminating in the emplacement of Russian missiles on its territory, and the subsequent international nuclear crisis in October 1962. By then no one—in

Cuba or out of it—doubted the nature of the regime, or its international orientation; its uniqueness consisted in it had entered the Soviet family of nations on its own, rather than on the heels of the Red Army. While Cuba's geographical location, combined with a new and even more radical economic dependence, posed special logistical problems for the Soviet Union, there was no reason, at least in theory, why the island could not survive indefinitely as a satellite floating in the Caribbean, a kind of tropical Bulgaria. Under such circumstances Cuba would always vote with the Soviets at international conclaves; would provide Spanish teachers for Soviet intelligence schools; would act as a center of coordination for the Communist parties of Latin America; and would offer aid and comfort to revolutionaries seeking to overthrow right-wing dictatorships in the Caribbean and Central America.

This was clearly a foreign policy more aggressive and challenging than that of Perón's Argentina or Cárdenas's Mexico, but it could still be seen as an adjunct to a revolution whose principal purpose was to alter the fundamental nature of Cuban society, and offer a more attractive model of economic and social development to Latin America and the Third World. In the second half of the 1960s, domestic and foreign policies entered a kind of parity; for a while there was an equal emphasis on the creation of a "New Man" in Cuba and the proliferation of guerrilla movements in South America ("One, two, many Vietnams," as Ché Guevara put it). In 1967, Guevara himself was killed in Bolivia; the following year the regime failed to attain its goal of a ten million ton sugar harvest.

In the following decade, Cuba experienced considerable economic and social regression at home, culminating in the massive exodus of thousands at Mariel in 1980. But at the same time the 1970s were a period rich in foreign policy successes. The United States ended some of the most onerous features with the trade embargo imposed by the Kennedy Administration, and the two countries exchanged "interests sections." Diplomatic relations with many Latin American countries were re-established, and at the 1975 meeting of the Organization of American States Washington dropped its traditional insistence that member states continue to blockade the regime. The same year Castro intervened militarily in Africa, tipping the balance in the Angolan civil war. Cuban soldiers fanned out to other countries: in addition to 19,000 stationed in Angola in 1979, there were 20,000 in Ethiopia, and detachments in Mozambique, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Algeria. Cuban military "advisers" were reported in eight other African nations. In fact, by 1978, a quarter of the island's military establishment was

stationed abroad. The following year, Castro renewed his interest in Central America, achieving the unification of four contending factions in the Salvadoran guerrilla movement, and providing some of the decisive elements leading to the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He lost the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement—it is generally thought—only because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

"Cuba is, in fact, a new kind of state in the international system—one which finds its purpose in its world role rather than its growth and development at home."

Today, Cuba is the only Latin American country with a truly global reach; as Jorge Domínguez has said, it is a small country with a big country's foreign policy. It has the largest army in the Americas after Brazil and the United States; it is the only Latin American state to fight and win wars outside of the region (though its victory in Angola may be more a product of U.S. diplomatic weakness and vacillation than real military strength on the ground); it is the only Latin American country with the exception of Nicaragua (for which it serves as a model) to enjoy a constituency of its own in U.S. domestic politics—in parts of the U.S. Congress, the media, and the academic and religious communities. This constituency is, of course, extremely small, but extremely intense, and superbly placed to counterbalance qualitatively the influence of its numerically superior adversaries.

This is an extraordinary achievement for a country with virtually no important resources other than political will, a fortuitous relationship with one great power, and the capacity to manipulate elements of the other. Cuba is, in fact, a new kind of state in the international system—one which finds its purpose in its world role rather than its growth and development at home. Indeed, its domestic base is far poorer now than it was thirty years ago. Whereas most development indicators placed it second or third among Latin American nations, it is now ranked in the lower double-digits, behind the Dominican Republic, which most Cubans once despised as a particularly backward neighbor.

Cuba's international role has been possible, of course, only because of its continuing subsidy from the Soviet Union, for whom it serves as a proxy in areas of the Third World where Moscow has chosen not to intervene directly. As the first Spanish-speaking socialist state, it provides the Soviets with the

linguistic equivalent of a warm water port. This is not to suggest Cuba is in some way a puppet of the Soviet Union, but rather, there is a strong congruence of interests which make it possible for Cuban and Soviet foreign policies to work in tandem.

Whether Cuba is quite so successful from the Soviet perspective is quite another matter; there must have been many moments over the past thirty years when the men in Moscow allowed themselves to wonder what they were getting for what now amounts to somewhere between \$25 and \$30 billion, or if what they were getting was worth what they were spending for it. Certainly Cuba no longer constitutes a possible alternative model for Latin American development; it can only be valuable as an advance military and intelligence guard of Soviet foreign policy. If Gorbachev's "new thinking" does in fact significantly alter his country's objectives in the world, where will that leave Cuba? The Soviet Union is, after all, a great power in function not merely of its raw military capability but its huge geographical extent, its natural resources, and in some areas its technology. It can reasonably expect to alter its priorities without reducing its international importance—quite the opposite, in fact, if Gorbachev succeeds in his stated goals. The same could hardly be said of Cuba. It is neither actually or potentially a great power—it is simply a large Caribbean island, and try as it might, it can never be anything else.

"Certainly Cuba no longer constitutes a possible alternative model for Latin American development; it can only be valuable as an advance military and intelligence guard of Soviet foreign policy."

Indeed, the centrality of foreign policy to the Cuban political system is such that one must wonder whether that system could reasonably hope to survive a change in Soviet objectives or practice. It is not principally a matter of a cut-back in aid, since Castro has proven time and again he can force his people to accept an ever-lower standard of living without seriously endangering his hold on power. Rather, it has to do with the rationale and mystique of the regime. If there is no role for Cuba in the revision of the international system, then why does it need so large a defense establishment? Why is its standard of living so low? Why does it need to antagonize the United States, its most obvious natural market? Above all, why does it require a political dictatorship with the corresponding apparatus of a police state? These are dangerous questions. If all Cuba wished were to be non-aligned and accept assistance

from both East and West, in today's world this would be perfectly possible within the framework of more open political systems—as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia and many other Latin American countries have proven. In this one regard, in fact, Cuba is the only country in Latin America not to benefit from its own revolution, which essentially destroyed the Monroe Doctrine, and greatly reduced what Washington could reasonably expect from other states in the inter-American system.

"Indeed, the centrality of foreign policy to the Cuban political system is such that one must wonder whether that system could reasonably hope to survive a change in Soviet objectives or practice."

What will the next decade hold for Cuban foreign policy? The question would be easier to answer if we knew first, what the next decade was to hold for Soviet foreign policy. Under circumstances by no means difficult to imagine, the Cuban regime might be facing a crisis far more profound than any which the United States might induce. Without allies, without enemies, without an "internationalist" mission, can Cuba survive? This promises to be one of the really interesting political questions for the next decade and beyond.

Questions & Answers

Speaker: How do you explain the relationship between Cuba and other Latin American countries over the last five years?

Dr. Falcoff: Well, at one time, there was much greater agreement between the United States and the major Latin American countries on exactly what kind of a threat Cuba constituted to the system. However, since about the mid-1970s, there has been a significant disagreement on whether Cuba is even a threat. Cuba has reopened diplomatic relations with a number of countries, although sometimes these have had to be closed again. I am thinking of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, which have all opened and closed relations with Cuba several times, when they found the Cuban Embassy doing things they didn't think were appropriate to diplomatic missions. Nonetheless, as I pointed out, I think the Latin American countries in some ways benefit from the existence

of Cuba as a non-player in the system. It's a useful stick to beat the United States over the head with. It's something you can point to, to say, "So you don't like this, but at least we aren't that."

Cuba did try to destabilize a number of countries like Venezuela, Colombia, even Argentina in the 1960s, and these states proved to be much more viable than Castro and Ché Guevara had imagined, and as Irving Horowitz was saying this morning, in some ways perhaps the national security establishments of many countries are stronger today in reaction to what was the perceived Cuban threat.

There's also the "blood is thicker than water" concept. After all, Cuba is a Latin American country. There has always been a great reluctance on the part of most Latin American countries to accept the notion Cuba's grievances against the United States are not typical Latin American grievances. There is a strong desire to fit Cuba in the category of Cárdenas's Mexico, a country that is merely trying or at least was trying to pursue narrow revindicationist goals and the United States didn't understand or was arrogant; that we forced them into this situation with the Soviet Union, and if the United States would change its policies, Cuba could rejoin Latin America, and we could spend all of our time negotiating compensation for the United Fruit Company.

It's a genuine conceptual difference between, I would say, the Latin American diplomatic establishment, and at least part of the American diplomatic establishment. I think part of the American diplomatic intellectual establishment accepts the Latin American perspective, and that's why we have a debate in this country all the time over Cuba, which in many ways echoes the kind of debate that goes on between the foreign ministries of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, and the Reagan Administration.

Don Shannon, *Los Angeles Times*: When you said it was doubtful that Cuba could survive without enemies, it reminded me of something that Secretary General Orfila of the OAS said just before he went out of office, that the United States had created Castro, and we were in the business of creating Ortega, but I guess we couldn't quite make it.

Does amplification of that statement about enemies means that if we would just be neutral toward the Cubans, we would destroy them?

Dr. Falcoff: What I was trying to say was if the Cubans were willing to concentrate all their energies on domestic life as ordinary countries do—ordinary countries that are not great powers, anyway—there would be no reason for the United States not to be neutral. We would, of course, have some

concerns, I would hope, in the human rights area, and a few other places, but there would be no particular reason for the United States to be very interested in whether Cuba had entered trade with the United States, whether Cuban diplomats left twenty-five-mile boundaries in New York, and I concede—I think any student of Cuban-U.S. relations has to concede—if we did have normal relations with Cuba, in and of itself that would be destabilizing to the regime.

The existence of the U.S. has always been destabilizing to all Cuban regimes, because it's a model so close, that the Cubans have not been able to replicate. They've been able to replicate it here, but they haven't been able to replicate it in Cuba. It's a double-edged sword. And the big question is how do you deal with this? Is isolation the policy that will be more effective in undermining the regime than smothering it with love?

Well, it isn't as simple as that for some of the reasons outlined here. But my point was the regime's own internal mystique, stability, and rationale, given its failure in the domestic area, has to be its international role and its international status. If it can't have that, I just don't know whether it can survive. It can survive with guns and with police intelligence, as undemocratic regimes do, but it certainly cannot institutionalize itself, and one has to wonder whether it can survive Castro himself. That was what I meant.

Speaker: You said Cuba couldn't survive politically because of being with the Soviet Union. However, even if the Soviet Union rethinks its goals and strategy, would you agree with Professor Valenta they wouldn't give up the military strategic interest in Cuba?

Dr. Falcoff: That all depends on how the Soviet Union chooses to actualize its own new thinking, because if the Soviet Union decides it isn't going to subsidize Cuba any more, or Nicaragua either, then the question is going to be how and where this country is going to get the resources to exist even at the most minimal level. I am not talking about a reduction of aid of 20 or 30 percent, but a radical decline in that commitment, which is an immense commitment for the Soviet Union.

If the Soviets reach the point where they are no longer interested in Central America or the Caribbean, as some of us have been told all along, and they prove it with their resources, it is going to be very difficult for the "Albania of the Caribbean" to survive without some minimal level of subsidy from the Soviet Union. Of course, none of us know exactly where that level is. That was really what I meant.

Mr. Betancourt: Mark, the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola is frequently said to be a problem for Fidel—to absorb these troops into the Cuban economy—although he has indicated clearly he is not so concerned with that. In fact, in an article in the *New York Times* yesterday, the Cuban general said they were all going to get jobs, or something like that.

However, based on your analysis, with which I agree, of the meaning of the international role for Cuba, would you say psychologically the return of these people means the end of internationalism? And that could have serious repercussions in the image the people have of the Revolution and its future, that the international role of Cuba would be so diminished they may think all they have is their little island in the Caribbean. What do you think?

Dr. Falcoff: Well, I think it is too early to say whether it will be the end of internationalism. It is the Soviets who will have to make that decision, but the withdrawal of troops, the repatriation of large armies from overseas wars, is always destabilizing to societies. Most people think the use of French African troops in Europe in World War I had an immensely destabilizing influence on the French colonial hold in Africa, and I have read the same thing about the use of colonial troops in the British Empire during World War I and World War II.

One has to just assume, using one's historical imagination, there are going to be some feedbacks into the domestic environment in Cuba, which are not going to be favorable to the regime. It will probably not have the resources to easily absorb these people. It may indeed be, from all I have read, these troops maybe won't eat as well in Cuba as they did in Africa, maybe. But it is a little too early to speak of the end of internationalism. It is an interesting question. It's another double-edged sword: which is more damaging to the Castro regime, to be burying thousands of Cubans in Angola, or leaving, having won, and not have that hemorrhaging of resources? Which is the most destabilizing? I don't think anyone can say at this point.

Speaker: Mark, Castro in past years has tried unsuccessfully to promote a Latin American moratorium or renunciation of their debts to the U.S. Now the situation seems to be worsening. If the new administration here does not formulate a new policy regarding this, can you visualize the possibility of Castro again leading a movement or associating himself with a movement in Latin America?

Dr. Falcoff: Well, that is possible, but I would say there are plenty of candidates, much more respectable candidates for that, including Carlos Andres

Pérez or Alan Garcia. One wouldn't have to wait for Castro to do that. There's any number of Latin American populist leaders, including a whole new wave about to peak.

So it wouldn't necessarily have to be Castro. I always feel, though—and I come back to my point about how Castro is useful to the more orthodox Latin American countries—in some ways he represents the worst case scenario. He is a useful card in the deck to negotiate with the United States, precisely because he always takes such maximalist positions. It then makes people like Carlos Andres seem, all things considered, fairly responsible. I think it would be bad negotiating tactics on the part of the other Latin American countries to get behind Castro. That's probably not likely. I don't think it would serve their interest.

Speaker: Why is Mexico so supportive of Castro and Cuba?

Dr. Falcoff: Well, for the same reason Mexico was pro-German in World War I. If it's against the U.S., there must be something good about it, and we'll find out what it is later. Mexico, as a country with a 2500 mile boundary with the United States, and all kinds of historical grievances of its own, having to do with the loss of its territory and so on and so on, is a country which necessarily must be and always is anti-American, particularly in those areas of its foreign policy which are a lot more symbolic than substantial.

Mexico finds in its relationship with Cuba a way of balancing out its independence from the United States, and tilting to the left in international affairs, without dealing with an issue which, for them, is not of very great substance. At the same time, Mexico is one of the countries that advocates the view that if Castro is a Communist, or if Castro is a Soviet ally, it's all the fault of the United States, which was so uncomprehending and so on and so on. It's essentially a revisionist view in foreign affairs and, as I say, it allows Mexico to play a role which balances out its extreme dependence on the United States in economic and financial respects. At least that is the way I read it.

Thank you very much.

U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS ROUNDTABLE

Ambassador Sally Shelton-Colby

Pamela Falk

William Perry

Joseph Blatchford

Ambassador Sally Shelton-Colby has held several senior positions in government and the private sector. She served from 1979 to 1981 as U.S. Ambassador to Grenada, Barbados and several other Eastern Caribbean nations. Currently, she is a consultant to Bankers Trust, responsible for political analysis of Latin American economic and debt policy. Ambassador Shelton-Colby is also an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University.

Pamela Falk is Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University where she is on the faculty of the School of International and Public Affairs. Dr. Falk is also Project Director of "U.S. National Security in Mexico: U.S.-Mexican Relations in the 1990s," a research project sponsored by the J. Howard Peru Memorial Trust. She is author of Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest.

William Perry, President of the Institute for the Study of the Americas, is a veteran Latin American specialist with two decades of experience at prestigious academic institutions, in government service and in private consulting. He has written extensively on hemispheric affairs and other international topics for publications in Europe and Latin America, as well as the United States. Mr. Perry served as Chairman for the working groups dealing with Latin America for the presidential campaign of George Bush.

Joseph Blatchford has extensive experience in commercial and political affairs in Latin America and the United States. Prior to his entry into the private practice of law, Mr. Blatchford held several appointments in the Ford and Nixon Administrations, including Director of the Peace Corps (1969-72), founding director of ACTION (1971-72), and Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce (1976-77). Currently, he is a partner in the law firm of O'Connor & Hannan.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: I feel a bit uneasy speaking about Cuba to such a distinguished group of Cubanologists. I am certainly not a specialist on Cuba. I am, I suppose, a Latin America generalist. Therefore, I will shape my remarks in a very general way. I'd like to start by referring to a couple of points Mark Falcoff made.

"No one, beyond perhaps Nicaragua, looks to Cuba for political and economic leadership and inspiration."

Number one, I don't think we really have very much to fear from Cuba. Cuba has been a tremendous economic and political failure. One can argue about whether there have been some social achievements, I will not participate in that debate, because I don't know enough about it. But by any economic or political measure, Cuba has failed to achieve stature as a model worthy of emulation by other countries. On the contrary, the whole world is moving toward market-oriented economic systems and political pluralism and democracy. No one, beyond perhaps Nicaragua, looks to Cuba for political and economic leadership and inspiration.

I agree with him also perhaps the single most startling change that has occurred in Latin America, both politically as well as intellectually, in the last twenty years has been the growing rejection, even by the Left in Latin America, of the Cuban model. This is truly a revolutionary change. As recently as a few years ago, you would hear most Latin American intellectuals and political Leftist leaders applauding Cuba. You really do not hear that very much today, except from the hard Left. With few exceptions—Peru, Nicaragua, and Salvador—the hard Left in Latin America today is extremely weak, if it even exists. And on the Center-Left, you hear a growing chorus rejecting Cuba's economic model.

Why? Because it clearly has not delivered the goods. Compare the Cuban economic model with the Brazilian economic model. Last year, Brazil had the third largest trade surplus in the world; its manufacturing capacity now exceeds Canada's. Even with all its problems, Brazil has one of the most productive private sectors in the hemisphere. So does Chile and the Dominican Republic. Cuba can't compare. So, Cuba, through an unproductive, stagnant, outmoded economic model, has contributed to, I would argue, its decline in terms of its being any kind of an attractive political model.

Someone asked Mark about Castro's leadership on the debt issue. Castro

does not provide any leadership on the debt. He has consistently called for—as I'm sure you all know—an international repudiation of the debt. Not just for a moratorium, but for a repudiation. None of the big debtors of Latin America—not even Alan García—has listened to him. The smaller debtors of Latin America who have suspended debt service, have done so not because they're listening to Fidel Castro, but rather because they've simply run out of money. Are we moving toward a multilateral suspension of debt service or moratorium? I happen to think not, unless interest rates skyrocket, in which case all bets are off.

My argument would be contrary to Castro's appeals to repudiate the debt, the large debtors are all bending over backwards to cooperate with their creditors. Are they calling for debt relief? Are they trying to get debt reduction? Yes, absolutely, but the basic context in which all the major debtors are operating is one of cooperation with both commercial as well as public creditors.

To sum up why Cuba over the last twenty-eight years has deteriorated as a model for Latin America to emulate is due in large part, as I've suggested, to the deterioration of the Cuban economic model, but to other factors as well. For example, I think Cuba's role in Grenada—apart from the U.S. invasion—and its failure to bring about any meaningful growth there was looked at very closely. Cuba could not really do very much for Grenada besides build an airport. In addition, another element which I think many North Americans don't really focus on was the Cuban Navy bombing a Bahamian gunboat in 1980. This might have not made much news in the United States, but it sent shock waves through the Caribbean because it was the first time, to my knowledge anyway, there had been an overt use of force by Cuba against a Caribbean neighbor, and that hurt its reputation badly in the Caribbean.

"...contrary to Castro's appeals to repudiate the debt, the large debtors are all bending over backwards to cooperate with their creditors."

Now, in one and a half minutes, because I'm about to run out of time, I would like to suggest for the incoming administration in Washington two useful avenues to pursue. The United States has to expand its dialogue with Cuba. We should establish certain parameters to those talks and one of our objectives should be to insist Cuba not only get out of Central America, but also

reduce its defense forces and its relationship with the Soviet Union. I think we have everything to gain by talking, and very little to lose. If the Cubans are serious about negotiating then we should be able to get important concessions from them. Indeed, concessions would have to be made by both sides. We should also push for a commitment to political pluralism.

You might say to me none of those things is possible. That might be the case, but let's sit down and talk and find out what's possible. We haven't really talked very much, at what I would call an appropriate level, in many years. Let's try it. If it doesn't lead to anything, then we back away.

Secondly, I would like to see Washington and other democracies in Latin America and elsewhere take the lead in mobilizing international public opinion in support of the idea of greater moves towards democracy in Cuba. Why not start with the idea launched by some Cuban democrats themselves of a plebiscite. It seems to me if you care about democracy, you have to care about it in the Soviet Union and in Cuba and not just in Chile and Paraguay. Or conversely, you have to care about it in Chile and Paraguay and not just in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

So why not try to put together as broad as possible a multilateral construct to involve the Felipe González's, the François Mitterand's, and the Carlos Andres Pérez's to put maximum pressure on Castro to begin a process of political liberalization by starting with a plebiscite. At the very least, we will test his good intentions. I think too often in the past Washington's efforts to push a human rights policy have not been sufficiently based on a broader base of support.

It's also absolutely scandalous Latin American democratic governments have not been more involved themselves in pushing for democracy internally. Let's just take the case of Chile. How many South American democratically elected heads of state or politicians were actively involved on the side of the movement for the "No" in Chile. I can't think of any except for some Venezuelan politicians. The Spaniards did provide some help. Did the French? No. Did the British? No. Did the Canadians? Not very much. I think it's absolutely outrageous that other democratic governments have failed to get involved in a more meaningful and visible way in efforts to pressure for democratic reform, regardless of where in the ideological spectrum the country in question is. I would think a multinational approach to democracy would be very much in keeping with the interests of the Bush Administration in building on the basically strong alliances Mr. Bush is going to be inheriting. With that, I'll stop.

Mr. Perry: What I've seen at this conference tends to reinforce my view along several lines: that normalizing relations, changing our policy toward Cuba, would clearly benefit Cuba more than the United States, and that Castro's foreign policy behavior and domestic behavior have not changed.

If you want to listen to our luncheon speaker, they probably won't change while he's alive, and therefore, I don't particularly see any reason for a change in our policy. In fact, if anyone can think of prudent ways to make our policy more restrictive, I would be open to them. That's the point of view I basically saw in deliberations inside the Bush campaign, and, though I have certainly no authority and no inclination to speak on behalf of the future Bush Administration, I have no particular reason to believe that any other point of view would prevail in our next government.

We're now in the middle of one of these quadrennial peace offensives by the Castro regime. You see it every four years. Personally, I'm very skeptical as to whether Castro wants good relations, and whether he's just not softening up some people who may already be somewhat soft above the shoulders, to the condition U.S. policy in some fashion, and impose limits on policy of the incoming administration. That's what we've seen in the past. We certainly saw it during the Carter Administration, which actually wanted to have good relations with the Castro regime. Indeed, it was in their platform, and what the Castro regime did to us was to continually kick sand in our face from Angola to Nicaragua.

I think we should start, at least, from a very stern and tough policy with respect to the Castro government. However, even if the basic assumption we make to begin with is not much has changed in Cuba and Cuba is very far away from the kind of changes that would be necessary to alter U.S. policy, we're still going to be asked questions and face pressure to review the normalization issue. So one of those questions I'd like to throw out is if nothing has changed in Cuba—an almost unimaginable change would be required to modify U.S. policy in any significant way—what is it that we would want out of Castro, and what would it be that we would do in response? Thank you.

Dr. Falk: There's a lot to be done on the Cuban agenda; Cuba has changed fairly significantly in the past few years. What I'd like to do is examine two changes and then outline ten guidelines to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Two areas have transformed the face of Cuban society: first, demographics are increasingly important to understanding Cuba today. The baby boom in Cuba is later than the U.S. boom. Today, 50 percent of the Cuban population is under the age of 25. And if you add Cubans under the age of 10 at the time

of the revolution (in other words, 39 years old or younger today) that's 72 percent of the population. Thus, roughly three-quarters of the population have no first-hand knowledge of the United States.

Second is Cuban involvement in Africa, specifically Angola, in the past few years, and, in domestic terms, the military transformation of Cuban society, partly as a result of the foreign policy and partly as a result of a "mobilization for defense" program. Over 600,000 Cubans have been trained in Africa and 450,000 in Angola alone, and what it has resulted in is a very well-trained army. Many of these soldiers returned to Havana with great hopes for promotion and for a hero's welcome. They are returning to a Cuba which has more Western influence than before—and more restless Cuban teenagers who are not as willing to tolerate Cuba's shortages. Thus, the Cuban Army has dramatically increased its ability to fight and U.S. policy must orient itself to these new circumstances.

"The first principle is U.S. policy should 'set' the U.S.-Cuba agenda. Too often, U.S. policy-makers have reacted to changes in Cuba's foreign—and domestic—programs..."

The first principle is U.S. policy should "set" the U.S.-Cuba agenda. Too often, U.S. policy-makers have reacted to changes in Cuba's foreign—and domestic—programs, rather than anticipating them. In Angola, as early as 1975, the U.S. reacted to Cuban involvement. In immigration, it took the Mariel boatlift for the creation of a U.S.-Cuba accord. U.S. policy would, needless to say, be in a stronger position of leverage if U.S. policy set the agenda.

The second guideline for U.S. policy is for U.S. leaders to get to know the next generation of Cuban leaders. Who are they? These "baby boomers" are coming of age and the old guard, the "Sierra Maestra generation," may be in power another ten years, but they are, doubtless, heading for retirement. After that, who is there? And what do we know about them? For example, there are the Cuban leaders who are running the Department of Revolutionary Orientation (DOR) of the Communist Party of Cuba. And the DOR is increasingly significant because it disseminates the information Cubans receive. The head of the DOR, Carlos Aldana, also led the Angolan negotiations. Then, a few years younger is Lt. Roberto Robaina, the young army officer who returned from Angola with military honors. For them, military service has become the test for the new leadership as the fight against Batista was the test for Castro's

generation.

The third guideline is U.S. policy needs to identify the next area of Cuban "internationalism." Although Cuban military assistance is unlikely to increase dramatically in Latin America or Central America, Southern Africa remains an area of turmoil in which an increase in Cuban involvement remains a possibility.

The fourth area concerns negotiations. The U.S. should continue intensive talks with the Soviet Union regarding Cuba. Cuba's policy remains oriented and financed—if not determined—by the U.S.S.R. When the U.S. starts discussions again with the Soviets, as the U.S. did in the Angola conflict, it creates pressure for the Cubans to compromise. And it is in the U.S. interest to settle several smaller issues, ones of mutual interest, such as hijacking and interdiction of narcotics.

The sixth guideline is to exploit Cuban differences with the Soviet Union, a point Dr. Valenta made earlier. Cuba is looking for a new superpower relationship. That is not intended to exaggerate the differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union but there are intense pressures. Cuba is feeling pressure from the Soviet Union to open the political system and, certainly, its economy.

The seventh area of bilateral relations is to understand small negotiations don't necessarily lead to diplomatic relations. If, on the other hand, there are issues of mutual interest, U.S. policy should test the waters in all areas—economic, strategic, diplomatic.

The eighth point on the agenda is to seek economic tools to influence the Cuban people. That does not mean a U.S. subsidy but rather an economic influence on the younger generation. Western culture is very attractive to Cubans; three weeks ago, the lines were around the block for *Fatal Attraction* and U.S. rock music is increasingly popular. Problems of distribution in Cuba even prompted Castro to talk about the shortages in his July 26th speech. It was his version of the famous Nixon "Checkers speech"—the Castro "Jobster speech"—and it has become a rallying point for young Cubans. There are shortages that underline the contradictions in Cuban society. Also, tourism is going to create problems within Cuba.

The penultimate guideline that should orient U.S. policy is intelligence gathering on Cuba's military and paramilitary development. The Territorial Troop Militia includes 1.2 million Cubans, and Cuba's standing army numbers almost 500,000, if reserve forces and several police units are included—not to mention the five million "deputized" members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). In an interview with Radio Martí,

Brigadier General Rafael del Pino, who defected from Cuba, pointed to the domestic paramilitary forces as a "brake" on the standing army. U.S. policy must understand the dynamics of Cuba's military.

The final point is U.S. policy-makers need to have direct contact with the next generation of Cuban leaders, the younger generation. Cuba's Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez said to me in an interview several years ago something that has always impressed me. It's an astute criticism of our own policy: "the United States looks to win, Cuba looks to the future."

Cuba is in a period of transformation. U.S. policy toward Cuba must adapt to those changes, understand Cuba's shifting alliances with the U.S.S.R., and tailor a policy that "sets the agenda" for U.S.-Cuba relations.

Thank you.

Mr. Blatchford: I was asked to substitute for Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, who is occupied with the visit of President Azcona. I am honored to do this because Secretary Abrams has been a clear and consistent voice for freedom in this hemisphere.

Twenty-seven years ago, the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, told President Kennedy: "We will bury you; our economic system is superior to yours. State control of the means of production and distribution; the individual subservient to the state; centralized planning of the economy is the wave of the future. The capitalist countries—the United States and Western Europe—will end up in the dustbin of history." Then, after perceiving a lack of American will and resolve to resist Soviet expansion, he began placing offensive missiles in Cuba.

Twenty-seven years later we find that Mr. Khrushchev was right. There is only one correct road to prosperity. But it is not communism or socialism. The results of economic models by developing countries in the last thirty years reached one conclusion: state-managed, state-organized, state-controlled economies have failed. The economic model based on private initiative, competition, open markets, decentralized government has brought economic prosperity and lifted up many of the poorest countries of the world.

The truth is the Soviets' Third World proteges live almost entirely off handouts from Moscow. Even Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev are riding the tide of economic liberalization. But how far they can go in delegating control to people to make economic choices in their individual lives and, at the same time, resist the pressure for political freedom as well, is not yet known.

The events of the world demonstrate a nation cannot give economic choice

and permit a rising tide of prosperity to its citizens and deny them political freedom as well, as witnessed in South Korea, Taiwan and Chile. At the same time, peoples who enjoy political freedom are demanding that their governments get out of the economy and let the market determine price and distribution of goods and services. They want to make their own economic choices. This is happening in Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Those who resist the path to economic freedom are the wave of the past. They are today's feudal states: North Korea, Ethiopia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Many developing countries, such as Turkey and many African nations, are reducing the role of the state and turning to the private sector as the economic engine. Even Mexico, one of the most protected and state-controlled economies in the world, is opening its markets and borders. They don't want to be left behind in the technological and information revolution.

"Mr. Castro is smart. He probably knows that political control cannot be omnipotent where there is private initiative and individual choice."

So what would Mr. Khrushchev say today, twenty-seven years later, when the front page of this morning's *New York Times* says the chief economists of the People's Republic of China are recommending that the state sell off its industries to private enterprise and decontrol and deregulate its economy?

Cuba remains in this small club, a member of the Middle Ages. But actually Mr. Castro is smart. He probably knows that political control cannot be omnipotent where there is private initiative and individual choice. To open his island would be to let in new ideas, to allow his people to see and witness firsthand the economic prosperity that is taking hold in the world. He is watching what happens when freedom breaks out in Eastern Europe and Estonia, and that is what prompts him to reject economic liberalization.

Listen to this: "It is the duty of the Revolution to give more and more authority to the Party. He who weakens the authority of the Party is weakening the Revolution." Fidel Castro, December 5, 1988! His creed imposed upon his people: total power, personal power, no cracks of personal freedom in the cement of the totalitarian state.

What should U.S. policy be in the light of these pronouncements of our neighbor? The answer: continue to resist totalitarian expansionism. Promote freedom. Take the diplomatic initiative around the world on behalf of democ-

racy, personal freedom, human rights, and individual initiative in the economic sphere.

And to Mr. Castro: you will not live forever. The next generation of leadership of your country may not want to live in isolation. They may either willingly or through the pressure of the people of Cuba and the people of the world decide that the ideas, initiatives, and choices for political freedom and economic well-being through private initiative are superior to the power of the dictatorial personality pursuing one single ideology. When that day comes the United States will sit down with your government to normalize relations, based on concrete actions, and we will welcome you into the society of progressive, civilized nations who believe in freedom, democracy, and human rights, and practice it. Meanwhile, keep your ideology within your borders. No one wants it. The only time the average man or woman raises their hand for your ideology—no matter how poor they may be, I might add—is when there is a gun pointed at them.

You are a beacon indeed, Mr. Castro, very much like what the world witnessed during the Olympic Games: two Koreans, one free and prospering in the south and the other poor and enslaved in the north. In this hemisphere the geography is reversed. There are two Cubas, one Cuba free and prosperous in the north and one enslaved and isolated in the south.

You, Mr. Castro, are among a handful of leaders in this world who, by abuse of political power, keep their people down, imprison them if they protest or create conditions which give them no alternatives but to leave your shores. You are the dustbin of history.

But in a perverse way you have enriched the cultures and the economies of the other nations in this hemisphere. I have lived in Venezuela and Brazil, and travelled through other countries in Latin America and seen Cuban exiles and refugees at work. Those who were forced to leave have created wealth and prosperity in many countries in this hemisphere, have become the middle and upper managers of major businesses and corporations. They have demonstrated what individuals can achieve in a climate of freedom.

Many years ago in Venezuela there was a popular song called "*El sol se fue de Cuba*." The sun of freedom is still gone from Cuban shores. But my friends let us continue to do all we can to keep hope alive. And with your effort and your persistence, *ojala que algún día se vuelva el sol a Cuba*.

Discussion

Dr. Valenta: We should go back to what Bill Perry suggested: What are we prepared to ask Cuba to do in order to establish a relationship with the United States? It seems to me we can come up with two basic conditions for dealing with Cuba, what we want from them. First, in terms of foreign affairs, we should insist that they come to a point where they agree with us there should be genuine power-sharing in both Angola and Nicaragua.

Mr. Perry: As an interim or a permanent solution?

Dr. Valenta: It could not be a permanent solution.

Mr. Perry: As interim to elections?

Dr. Valenta: Yes, surely to accept the opposition as a serious partner. Then I would consider starting to talk to them. That doesn't mean I would accept this as a permanent solution.

Second, in domestic affairs I think we should insist they embrace *glasnost* and open up their political system. There needs to be less suppression, at least as an interim measure. But most important to me, Cuba must cease to be an interventionist power. Of course, Cuban ties with the Soviet Union are also important and I am concerned about Soviet intelligence operations in Cuba.

Mr. Perry: And the level of armed forces?

Dr. Valenta: Yes, but the two most important issues are Cuba in Angola and in Nicaragua and the issue of the Soviet/Cuban military alliance.

Mr. Perry: And in exchange? What should the United States be prepared to do for things like that? Those are pretty big steps; I am hardly optimistic you are going to see this, but what would the United States have to do to see a result like this?

Dr. Valenta: You can't start a dialogue if they don't meet those conditions. Sure, we can have informal talks as we used to do in the 1970s, but we should not repeat our past mistakes in these talks. Indeed, I would propose a review of the past mistakes of leaders of both parties in dealing with Cuba, starting with the Cuban Missile Crisis, then Angola, Nicaragua, and so forth. Review the past cases and learn from them. The lessons have not been absorbed by American policy-makers.

Warner Rose, USIA: Dr. Falk, to what extent is Castro letting any leader come forward to take a prominent role? You mentioned several names. To what

extent is there any leader who we can negotiate with? If not negotiate with, then get to know better, to establish relations for the next generation?

Dr. Falk: In the short term, it is unlikely that any Cuban leader could collect any serious amount of power while Castro is president. But there are other leaders in Cuba, especially military leaders. Dr. Suchlicki has done some work on identifying some of them, and Dr. Belancourt as well, and I have also written on Cuba's political succession. I wouldn't bet on anyone in particular and I'd recommend to U.S. policy-makers they talk to several leaders of different generations because there are several directions that the succession could go. One is in the direction of the Communist Party, for example Carlos Aldana, who is certainly the "rising star" these days. Then there are the Generals: Abelardo Ibarra, Ulises del Toro, and Arnaldo Ochoa. I would watch that group and also the leaders of the youth, such as Lt. Roberto Robaina, who is the head of the Communist youth organization and served in Angola. Lt. Mlagros Karina is a woman who is also in that league. They are being brought up through the Communist Party and also being "tested" in military terms in Angola.

Wayne Smith, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: I am never quite certain what we mean when we begin to talk about normalizing relations. Let's face it, we have now full diplomatic relations with Cuba in all but name. Normalizing relations may be the frosting on the cake with Cuba but I don't see that it makes any difference to us at all.

Some people seem to have the idea that in trying to discuss and negotiate the various problems between the two countries it means we are going to become friends. Not at all! We deal on a pragmatic basis with all kinds of governments around the world which we dislike and with which we have serious disagreements. It would be the same with Cuba. Even when we have entered into, as I suspect we will in time, negotiations with them on various problems and have gotten those problems out of the way, we are not going to become friends. We are still going to be in something of an adversarial relationship. But we have to begin talking if we want to resolve these problems.

Take the matter of Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. It is utterly absurd to say Cuba must reduce its military ties with the Soviet Union as a precondition for talks with us. They cannot reduce their military relationship before working out at least some kind of inchoate relationship or accommodation with us and that would certainly be the quid on our part.

Stop basing the Bear reconnaissance bombers there and reduce the Soviet

military presence, and we for our part could reduce or terminate overflights and, as we see how things go, take other steps to reduce military tensions between the two countries, not hold maneuvers thirty miles off the Cuban coast anymore. You have to enter into the process if you want to resolve this problem.

We would not have a solution or we would not be on the way to a solution in Southern Africa without having engaged the Cubans and I would suggest we are unlikely to have any kind of a solution that would be lasting in Central America without involving the Cubans to some degree. It is not a matter of conceding everything and saying they are great fellows but quite the contrary. It is a matter of a practical engagement to achieve certain clear objectives.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: To carry Wayne's point a step further, I think too often discussions about the U.S. and Cuba center on the issue of normalization, which a lot of people define as the U.S. making all the concessions and the Cubans making none. That is absolutely not what "normalization" should be about.

In any bilateral relationship, you establish your objectives. Besides getting the Cubans out of Central America, I would like to see a reduction in the Cuban-Soviet relationship, a reduction in the size of the Cuban armed forces, and some internal political changes, such as greater political tolerance and relaxation of tensions. Those are the objectives I would impose as a condition of normalization. The Cubans have their agenda as well: resumption of trade and a few others. How can you hope to make any progress on any of these issues unless you talk to the other side?

Now, if you talk to the other side and, after a reasonable period of negotiation, you don't get anywhere, well then you stop. But if you have six objectives and, after a reasonable period of negotiation, you achieve three, it seems to me you've made some progress that you can then build on. But refusing to talk when we talk with everybody else in the world, except North Korea and Albania, seems to me to be losing an opportunity to solve some of the problems and achieve some of the objectives which I think most people in this room would agree on.

Mr. Blatchford: Let's just assume for the moment that we're willing to talk. We can use the China example. During the Nixon Administration, China sent a signal they were serious about improving relations with the United States, which had been frozen since 1949. Mao Zedong invited a ping-pong team to come and play. That led to another development and then another and now we

have very good relations with China. There was a sincere signal from the other side that they wanted improved relations. What signal is Mr. Castro sending today that he would like to improve relations with the United States? I'd like to know because all I read are these terrible anti-American speeches and anti-Soviet speeches, anti-anyone who talks to the United States. The anti-Americanism continues.

Wayne Smith: I'd be happy to answer that. He has entered into talks on Southern Africa and they have been successfully concluded. We have an agreement on immigration and Castro has been releasing political prisoners. He has indicated his willingness to talk about Central America. The overtures are there. We've got to pick them up.

"What signal is Mr. Castro sending today that he would like to improve relations with the United States? The anti-Americanism continues."

Mr. Blatchford: I don't see it that way. I see one step forward and two steps back. We saw certain overtures in 1978-79. I think there should be some negotiation in the interdiction of drugs, for example. That happened in the past, it can continue. There are other issues we obviously could talk about. But I think what we're really talking about here is he will never—except maybe if you consider this a sign in Angola, we don't know yet—never ever give up the revolutionary zeal to assist and intervene on behalf of violent revolutions in other countries.

Wayne Smith: That isn't the position of the Cuban government at all. Their position is it will always show its solidarity with national liberation movements. But how it does that is something else, again. It's patently absurd to say the Cuban position does not change. In 1973, they advocated revolution anywhere and everywhere; then, in 1982, they said conditions for armed struggle only existed in two countries, El Salvador and possibly in Guatemala. And even there, they had made it clear they would prefer a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Betancourt: Well, I think there are different levels of understanding our relationship with Cuba. We have an Interests Section in Havana. They have one here. So there is the possibility at any time to talk about any issue through the normal channel. What happens is Castro always tries to go directly to the

American public. I accompanied Castro at the time of his first visit to the United States. It's completely false to say it was the treatment by our administration that turned him off. Castro came here at the invitation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors of his own will. He refused to have any official business. He wanted rather to go over the head of the government for certain purposes he wanted to attain. This goes on to this day. If he wants to engage in conversation, he has the means available.

"...there is the possibility at any time to talk about any issue through the normal channel. What happens is Castro always tries to go directly to the American public."

Now all this talk about normalization is interesting. But permit me to submit to you an incident which happened last year. An American university professor travelled to Cuba with a delegation and they had a meeting with Ricardo Alarcón of Cuba's Foreign Ministry. They asked him what Cuba was prepared to do to normalize relations with the U.S. and his reply was "nothing." The United States should lift the embargo, start diplomatic relations and do it quickly, and there is nothing we would have to do in exchange.

"Well, during a recent Castro speech, Jay Taylor of our Interests Section in Havana had to walk out because of Castro's insults to the United States. That to me is not an indication of a willingness to engage in dialogue."

Now, I have told this before to Wayne, but I would rather have the Cuban government telling us what they want to do, than to have Wayne telling us what the Cubans are going to do. They are completely free to indicate what they want.

Now we hear about how things are improving. Well, during a recent Castro speech, Jay Taylor of our Interests Section in Havana had to walk out because of Castro's insults to the United States. That to me is not an indication of a willingness to engage in dialogue.

Another point: when the new head of the Cuba desk at the State Department went to Cuba, he had breakfast with a Cuban human rights activist. This

was on a Thursday and he was kicked out of Cuba on Friday. He was called to Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was told because he had a breakfast that was not on his schedule he had to leave the country. If we are really serious about having a dialogue, this seems very strange to me. In the United States, diplomats from the Cuban Interests Section are free to travel all over the place, to Congress, anywhere they want. No one is expelled from the U.S. for visiting or talking to some group that is opposed to American policy or whatever. But here you have the head of the Cuban office at the State Department being told to leave the country merely because he had breakfast.

"...for certain matters they have been interested in negotiating, but it's because the circumstances forced them to negotiate, which doesn't say much for Castro's willingness to come to terms with the United States ..."

Well, I don't think that kind of attitude indicates a willingness to be engaged in serious conversation. Going back to what Georgie Anne said at lunch, Fidel sees the United States as an enemy, and for him to be willing to negotiate, as he was forced to do in Angola, is unlikely. There the Soviet Union told him they were not going to be sending any more logistical support, so he had to get out. Castro had no choice because Cuba had no logistical capability to engage in a war in Angola unless the Soviet Union provided the support. This is a very important point. Yes, for certain matters they have been interested in negotiating, but it's because the circumstances forced them to negotiate, which doesn't say much for Castro's willingness to come to terms with the United States or to accept some of the conditions that have been indicated.

I would like to make two other points. Cuba is still exporting revolution, it is still subverting other governments. That must stop. On the question of drugs, Cuba is still involved in supporting groups that bring drugs to the United States and helping guerrillas like the M-19 in Colombia. The chief of the Cuban Navy was indicted for that in Miami. But prosecution in American courts is no longer given attention in the media and so it looks like this never happened. This is happening right now.

There's also the issue of extortion of the Cuban community. Not enough attention is being paid to that. It is outrageous that a Cuban living in this country has to pay \$20,000 to \$30,000 to some Cuban government blackmail operation to have the body of a relative buried in this country. The same

happens with bringing relatives as immigrants. The Cubans are getting money from people who want to get their relatives out of Cuba.

In addition, we are concerned with the whole campaign of intimidation the Cuban government wages in the United States. We at Radio Martí at times have had to cancel programs because of threats to the people interviewed. The minute somebody gets on the air, they get phone calls threatening them. We have serious problems with that. Some of our staff members have had people standing in front of their houses taking photos of them. That's intimidation and there's nothing being done about it.

The Cuban-American community has a right to expect the full protection of American law and they are not getting it. There has never been a single Cuban agent prosecuted in the United States in the last thirty years, and we have public confessions of people on what is happening. Yet it seems Cuban agents roam at will in the Miami area. It's a very serious problem. It has to be given attention and must be stopped. It is unacceptable behavior for a government with which we are supposed to be having diplomatic relations, and that should be addressed on behalf of the Cuban Americans.

"The fact we have negotiated with Fidel Castro over Angola has given Cuba and Castro a perception that they can act with impunity in the world; that they can introduce their military forces in other parts of the world, and then at the end of the road they're going to be rewarded with an agreement."

Dr. Suchlicki: Frankly, I'm just a little bit puzzled about the faith or belief in negotiations to solve complex international issues. There are issues that cannot be negotiated and cannot be resolved by agreement. Let me submit to you the example of Angola, on which we passed on tangentially today. The fact we have negotiated with Fidel Castro over Angola has given Cuba and Castro a perception that they can act with impunity in the world; that they can introduce their military forces in other parts of the world, and then at the end of the road they're going to be rewarded with an agreement. This agreement allows the Cubans to extricate themselves from a very difficult situation in Angola, removing their troops over a long period of time without any significant impact on Cuba.

What Cuba has achieved at the negotiating table is what it couldn't achieve

on the military battlefield. One, the consolidation of the MPLA regime in Angola; two, a Namibia probably under the control of SWAPO; three, the neutralization of Savimbi; and four, the elimination of South Africa from Angola. So I think negotiations have led to a defeat of American policy in Angola.

Dr. Falk: I definitely agree with Dr. Suchlicki, that it's a win for the Cubans. They are very happy with this agreement and, as of January 1988, they were satisfied to be included at the bargaining table with the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This was not the case in 1962. It has elevated their status enormously in international circles, and it has given them that "win." But Washington also wins because the U.S. succeeded in linking the Cuban withdrawal to the peace process. You have to give credit to Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker. If it succeeds, the agreement will have gotten the majority of the Cuban troops out of Angola. The Cubans won also because they succeeded in making their military about four times as strong as it was when they went into Angola. They even "showed up" the Soviets by being stronger and better at military strategy in Africa. They were certainly better than the FAPLA forces. I believe there's still an ominous cloud with regard to Cuban troops—the Cubans will not be out when other Africa conflicts worsen and Cuban troops could be called in to battle.

Dr. Suchlicki: Well, I have one small comment. I think the United States lost because it didn't act like a great power and it didn't make Fidel Castro pay for his adventurism in Africa, and it is that kind of lesson the Cubans are learning and other dictators in the world are learning, that the United States does not act like a great power. It does not have a policy to win. It has a policy of compromise and negotiation.

Mr. Blatchford: One important thing to continue to point out, especially after negotiations like this—and I disagree with Wayne Smith—is there's no indication Fidel Castro has given up his desire to play a major role in the world in insurrections against United States-backed regimes. Negotiations over fishing rights and things which are helpful to a country ninety miles away are not unimportant, but they're not the issue. The issue that confronts all of us is our security, which means Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. That's what is on the line. Cuba is the major outside player, and I believe will continue to be so even if Gorbachev says cool it. Cuba will continue to push it, it is its ideology, it always has been and I see no indication it has changed.

Mr. Perry: There's sort of an asymmetry in relations with Cuba. The Castro

government does outrageous things and then we're expected to split the difference and recognize the regime, which is—considering relations are already broken and economic sanctions against the Cuban government presumably hurt Cuba more than the United States—essentially giving it a whole lot more benefits than we would receive in exchange.

"The same people were howling about Reagan's bad attitude towards the Soviet Union. It produced results."

Even if you can see that you may negotiate at some future date based on substantial changes that can't be foreseen—as was the case with Russia way back down the road on arms control—the best policy at the beginning is to be as tough as nails with people who are doing outrageous and unreasonable things. We should not make any preemptive concessions in the interest of some hypothetical equity between countries, when our situation with the Castro regime isn't equal, either practically or morally.

Mr. Blatford: It's part of the dialectic, part of their basic philosophy. They start with the most extreme position, and then they settle somewhere in between. They start revolution. They assist that revolution in El Salvador. When it's not going anywhere, they make as big a deal out of it as possible, and then they say they'll settle for power-sharing.

Mr. Perry: Yes, and that was the other area. Cuba's policy has changed from the 1960s. Yes, it's gotten more pragmatic, in the sense that it doesn't declare war on the whole universe anymore—it got that approach stuck in its ear. Now it only preys on people that break their legs. That's what the situation is. We have no reason to believe that that won't continue to happen. This gentleman identified El Salvador and Guatemala as the only targets and held this was a great concession from the Cuban standpoint. As it happens, these are the only countries right now with broken legs, or at least the Cubans perceive to have broken legs. But it doesn't say anything about what they'd do in Honduras tomorrow if there were a military coup.

Don Shannon, Los Angeles Times: The tenor of some of the panel seems to be it would be best to do nothing with the Cubans, but how do you do nothing and also answer the demand in the very powerful community in the United States that wants to have visits by relatives and so forth?

Mr. Perry: It worked under the Reagan Administration fairly well, as far as I'm

concerned. There's no absolute flat-out prohibition against discussions with the Cuban government, when there are mutual interests involved. But on the other hand, we showed and should show no great desire to improve relations in such a way that would clearly benefit the Cuban government more than they would benefit the United States—a situation that would result from almost any form of normalization I can imagine.

The same people were howling about Reagan's bad attitude towards the Soviet Union. It produced results. I went through a lot of university audiences and heard all kinds of fruitcakes telling me that relations with the Soviet Union were terrible and this was dangerous. It was all nonsense. The Russians didn't provoke the Reagan Administration once, as far as I'm concerned. And eventually, the Reagan Administration put itself in a position where it could negotiate from strength if the instability in the Soviet leadership turned out positively, as it seems to have, or it could defend itself if it didn't. That's the negotiating position we should generally be in.

Mr. Blatford: I don't think anyone is suggesting doing nothing. I haven't heard that yet. Some are suggesting aggressive talks and negotiations; others, like myself, are suggesting a very aggressive international diplomatic offensive to isolate Cuba, to put pressure on it, and do the same thing to Nicaragua and any other outlaws that are suppressing their own people and trying to encourage revolutions among their neighbors. A very aggressive, positive campaign that would bring in the other countries of this hemisphere and the world, identify what is going on in these countries and what are their national interests, makes very clear the policy of the United States. That's not doing nothing.

Now, at the moment in which they say they don't like this treatment, they don't like the kind of opprobrium that they're getting from the rest of the world and want to change their behavior, then let's talk, of course. You want to change your behavior to meet the standards we've set up in this diplomatic offensive? Fine, we're always willing to listen. If you're willing to change, then there's something to discuss.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: I may have misunderstood some of the concerns expressed about the concept of asymmetry. If that's true, then I am disturbed by what I'm hearing, that Cuba is more "damaged" by the current status of U.S.-Cuba relations and we're really not I don't see how anybody can make that argument. Here we have, ninety miles from our shores, a large Soviet military presence—whether it's offensive or defensive, I don't really care very

much, it's there—we have an island which is deeply involved in at least two Central American countries. God knows what else they're doing. I no longer have access to the classified reporting. We have, ninety miles from our shores, a government that may or may not be involved in drug trafficking. Again, I don't know the facts on this allegation. I don't have access to the intelligence. Another thing we don't talk enough about is Cuban support for the Puerto Rican independence movement. I am very troubled by this situation and I really feel that anyone who suggests that the current status of relations between our two countries somehow benefits us more than it does the other side is just dead wrong and is not looking at the cost we are paying for the relationship.

Mr. Perry: It was asymmetry in what's likely to come out of the negotiations rather than the present situation.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: Why do you assume that asymmetry will come out of negotiations? I think anyone who has had experience in negotiating any kind of international agreement seeks as approximate a symmetry or balance as he or she can get. And if he or she is not seeking proximate symmetry, then he or she should not be negotiating. Why is it always necessary to argue or to conclude that because you start talking, the other guy is going to come out with a better deal than you do? Maybe we'll come out with the better deal.

Mr. Blatchford: I don't think it's that. It's just that there is a lot of cynicism. After all, the Carter Administration tried it, Vernon Walters has been to Havana, Secretary Haig met with the Cubans in Mexico, Thomas Enders tried in Nicaragua. There have been many attempts to reach some serious discussions and they haven't gone very far.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: So you would classify the Reagan Administration's policy towards Cuba as a failure?

Mr. Blatchford: No, it's not a failure. But it's a failure to the extent if you say someone tries to talk to somebody else and that person says no, we're going to continue our revolution and we're going to continue to aid guerrillas in El Salvador. We don't want to talk about that, we want to talk about you dropping the trade embargo and other things like that. If those talks don't go anywhere, then it's a failure, and properly so. But I wouldn't call agreeing to the other side's terms a successful Administration policy. It would be a failure if we conceded to those terms.

Ambassador Shelton-Colby: But nobody is arguing that. With all due respect,

I think you and Bill have really distorted part of the debate here today. To negotiate implies both sides getting something and both sides giving up something. What patriot is going to argue we should give up everything and the Cubans give up nothing? Nobody is making that argument.

Mr. Blatchford: It sounds exactly like what we heard before with the Russians—the pounding President Reagan got year after year because he wouldn't sit down and negotiate with the Soviet Union. He always said he was prepared to negotiate as soon as they were. Then he launched a major offensive to build up our defenses, to surround them diplomatically, to help the rebels in Afghanistan. And then there came a moment in which they said, yes, it is in our interest to negotiate. At that moment we were able to conduct some successful negotiations.

"You can have wonderful discussions about how it's good to talk to everybody and you can always split the difference. But when you have unreasonable people making unreasonable demands and then you are supposed to split the difference with them all the time and there's pressure in the United States to do so, it usually leads to a bad conclusion."

Mr. Perry: And the natural desire of the United States to be somewhat reasonable has to be restrained a little bit or, in practice, it gets taken advantage of. You can have wonderful discussions about how it's good to talk to everybody and you can always split the difference. But when you have unreasonable people making unreasonable demands and then you are supposed to split the difference with them all the time and there's pressure in the United States to do so, it usually leads to a bad conclusion. We only have to look at the records of the Reagan Administration and the Carter Administration to see this kind of difference in results. You can have wonderful academic seminars critical of the Reagan Administration, except that it put itself in a position to get such results. And the other perspective that involves chasing unreasonable people around to discuss things with them, doesn't actually work in practice.

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
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